FBI WHISTLEBLOWER TESTIMONY HIGHLIGHTS GOVERNMENT

ABUSE, MISALLOCATION OF RESOURCES, AND RETALIATION

Interim Staff Report of

Committee on the Judiciary

and the

Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government

U.S. House of Representatives

May 18, 2023

ATTENTION:

All Justice Department and FBI Employees

You have a right to speak with Congress

Every federal employee of the Department of Justice and

FBI has an unfettered right to communicate with Congress,

without the approval, consent, or awareness of the Department

or the FBI. Federal law protects these disclosures.

Whistleblowers are an invaluable source for Congress in

identifying, understanding, and remedying waste, fraud, abuse,

and mismanagement. The Committee on the Judiciary is charged

with conducting constitutional oversight of the Department of

Justice and FBI.

Any Justice Department or FBI personnel with information

are encouraged to contact the Republican staff of the Judiciary

Committee at (202) 225-6906.

Executive Summary

The Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of

the Federal Government are charged by the House of Representatives with conducting oversight

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Whistleblower testimony from rank-and-file FBI

employees is an essential part of this oversight. From accounts provided by these brave and

dedicated law-enforcement officers, Congress can better understand, and ultimately address, the

serious problems infesting the senior leadership ranks of the FBI. It is clear from these

disclosures, and especially in wake of Special Counsel John Durham’s report, that the FBI has

become politically weaponized.

To date, the Committee and Select Subcommittee have received whistleblower testimony

from several current and former FBI employees who chose to risk their careers to expose abuses

and misconduct in the FBI. Some of these employees—Special Agents Garret O’Boyle and

Stephen Friend, Supervisory Intelligence Analyst George Hill, and Staff Operations Specialist

Marcus Allen—have chosen to speak on the record about their experiences.

The disclosures

from these FBI employees highlight egregious abuse, misallocation of law-enforcement

resources, and misconduct with the leadership ranks of the FBI. Among other disclosures:

• The FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO) pressured a field office in Boston,

Massachusetts, to open investigations on 138 individuals who traveled to Washington,

D.C., to exercise their First Amendment rights on January 6, 2021, with no specific

indication that these people were involved in any way in criminal activity. The only basis

for investigating these people was that they shared buses to Washington with two

individuals who entered restricted areas of the Capitol that day. Rather than limiting the

investigation to just the two people who entered restricted areas, the WFO instructed the

Boston Field Office to open investigations on all 140 individuals who attended the

political rally.

• In response to the WFO’s pressure to open investigations into all 140 individuals, the

Boston Field Office asked the WFO for more evidence, including video from the Capitol,

to properly predicate the investigations. The WFO provided pictures of the two

individuals inside the Capitol; however, the WFO refused to provide video evidence from

the Capitol out of fear it would disclose undercover officers or confidential human

sources inside the Capitol.

• Shortly after the events of January 6, 2021, Bank of America (BoA) provided the FBI

with confidential customer data—voluntarily and without any legal process. BoA gave

WFO a list of individuals who had made transactions in the Washington, D.C. area using

a BoA product between January 5 and January 7, 2021. Individuals who had previously

purchased a firearm with a BoA product were reportedly elevated to the top of the list.

Because of the false and defamatory attacks that Democrats on the Committee and Select Subcommittee

perpetrated against Friend, O’Boyle, and Hill, Allen initially only consented to speaking with the Committee’s

majority.

• FBI leadership pressured agents to reclassify cases as domestic violent extremism (DVE),

and even manufactured DVE cases where they may not otherwise exist, while

manipulating its case categorization system to create the perception that DVE is

organically rising around the country.

• The FBI dispenses cash bonuses to local field office leadership for meeting certain

arbitrary metrics and performance goals. This bonus structure creates perverse incentives

for the FBI to utilize law-enforcement tools and resources where they may not be needed

or appropriate in order for FBI leadership to benefit financially.

These FBI employees have come forward to blow the whistle at great personal and

professional risk. Each of these whistleblowers described retaliatory conduct that they have faced

after making protected disclosures about what they believed in good faith to be wrong conduct.

A recurring theme is that the FBI has violated federal whistleblower protection laws and abused

its security clearance review process to hamstring the brave agents who exercise their right to

make protected disclosures to Congress or who dared to question agency leadership. For

example:

• Special Agent O’Boyle made protected disclosures to his Supervisory Special Agent

about potentially illegal activity, and the FBI transferred him to a new unit that required

him to move his family across-country. When O’Boyle arrived for his first day, the FBI

placed him on unpaid, indefinite suspension, effectively rendering his “family homeless”

and leaving them without any personal effects—including his young children’s

clothing—because these items were in FBI storage.

• Likewise, in Special Agent Friend’s case, the FBI suspended his security clearance after

making protected disclosures. This suspension rendered Friend unable to fulfill his duties

as a special agent—thus, the FBI suspended him indefinitely. While on suspension, the

FBI refused to allow Friend to obtain outside employment, leaving his family without

income.

• In Staff Operations Specialist Allen’s case, the FBI suspended his security clearance for

simply performing duties of his job—conducting case-related research using open-source

news articles and videos and sending his search results to his task force colleagues.

The FBI leadership’s trend toward political partisanship in recent years has disturbed the

ranks of front-line FBI agents like O’Boyle, Friend, and Hill. In the words of one whistleblower,

the current state of the FBI is “cancerous” as the Bureau has “let itself become enveloped in this

politicization and weaponization.” This testimony supplements earlier disclosures from

whistleblowers, highlighted in the Committee’s November 2022 report, in which whistleblowers

described the FBI’s Washington leadership as “rotted at its core” and having a “systemic culture

of unaccountability.”

H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FBI WHISTLEBLOWERS: WHAT THEIR DISCLOSURES INDICATE ABOUT THE

POLITICIZATION OF THE FBI AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (Nov. 4, 2022).

The whistleblowers who have come to the Committee and Select Subcommittee

expressed sincere concern about the state of the FBI, but they remained optimistic that the

Bureau could improve with “tough love.” That concern and hope for the FBI’s future is

fundamentally what motivates these brave whistleblowers: the belief that speaking truth to

power, through the right channels, can help to restore the Bureau to what it once was. This report

builds on the disclosures of these whistleblowers to assist the Committee and Select

Subcommittee in understanding the problems so that Congress may consider potential legislative

reforms to America’s preeminent law enforcement agency.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 1

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ 4

I. FBI Whistleblower Disclosures Show Serious Abuses and Misallocation of Law-

Enforcement Resources. .......................................................................................................... 5

A. The FBI’s Cash Bonus System Creates Perverse Incentives to Use Law Enforcement

Tools for Leadership’s Financial Benefit and Not Legitimate Law Enforcement Needs. .. 5

B. The FBI Is Reclassifying and Manufacturing Domestic Violent Extremism Cases to

Advance a Political Narrative that These Cases Are on the Rise. .................................... 10

C. The FBI’s Washington Field Office Pressured the Boston Field Office to Investigate

Americans Solely for Traveling to Washington, D.C. on January 6. ............................... 23

D. The FBI Gathered Conservatives’ Financial Records from Bank of America Without Any

Legal Process Following January 6. ................................................................................. 30

E. Line Agents Opposed Attorney General Garland’s Memorandum Directing Federal Law

Enforcement Resources Against Parents .......................................................................... 34

II. FBI Leaders Weaponized the Security Clearance Adjudication Process Against

Whistleblowers in Retaliation for Blowing the Whistle. ...................................................... 42

A. Stephen Friend Was Suspended Without Pay After Questioning the FBI’s Handling of

DVE Cases and Expressing Concern about January 6 Tactics. ......................................... 42

A. Garret O’Boyle Was Suspended Without Pay After Moving His Young Family Across the

Country. .............................................................................................................................. 51

B. Marcus Allen Was Suspended for Merely Forwarding Open-Source News Articles to His

Colleagues. ......................................................................................................................... 59

C. Whistleblowers Have Described How the FBI’s Politicization Has Crowded Out its

Traditional Law Enforcement Function. ............................................................................ 63

III. Committee Democrats Attacked and Defamed FBI Whistleblowers to Advance a Political

Agenda. .................................................................................................................................. 67

A. The Democrat Report Erroneously Claims that the FBI Whistleblowers Who Have

Appeared Before the Committee Are Not Real Whistleblowers. ..................................... 67

B. The Democrat Report Slandered the Integrity of Veteran Federal Law Enforcement

Officers in the Service of Partisan Politics. ...................................................................... 71

C. Democrats Deployed the Same Abusive Tactics to Attempt to Discredit Journalists Matt

Taibbi and Michael Shellenberger. ................................................................................... 74

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 78

I. FBI Whistleblower Disclosures Show Serious Abuses and Misallocation of Law-

Enforcement Resources.

American citizens rightfully expect law enforcement agencies at every level to

judiciously exercise its powerful authorities and to properly allocate resources—employees,

funds, time, and other finite resources—to tackle the most-pressing issues facing the public. This

is especially true regarding the law-enforcement apparatus of the United States Department of

Justice.

However, whistleblower testimony revealed to the Committee and Select Subcommittee

that the FBI has abused it authority and egregiously misallocated the resources entrusted to it by

American taxpayers.

Particularly, several whistleblowers have described a perverse incentive structure that

promises FBI officials financial reward if they can justify opening more cases and meet other

investigative metrics as set by officials in Washington. Such an incentive structure is dangerous

because the FBI is a powerful law-enforcement agency engaged in the “often competitive

enterprise of ferreting out crime.”

It is axiomatic that the FBI should pursue its mission without

fear, favor, or expectation of financial profit. The public record is replete, however, with

instances of the FBI failing to meet this standard.

Meanwhile, whistleblower testimony has also

uncovered that the agency is engaging in the practice of ordering its agents to classify, and in a

number of cases, reclassify, particular investigations as involving “domestic violent extremism”

in efforts to merely support political talking points that the number of such cases is “on the rise.”

These whistleblower allegations are disturbing, and this section details specific whistleblower

testimony about these serious matters.

A. The FBI’s Cash Bonus System Creates Perverse Incentives to Use Law Enforcement

Tools for Leadership’s Financial Benefit and Not Legitimate Law Enforcement

Needs.

Whistleblowers have described a “disconcerting aspect of the FBI”—that is, Special

Agents-in-Charge (SACs) around the country are eligible to “get a monetary bonus at the end of

the year if they meet metrics.”

Indeed, according to testimony, SACs often keep computer

spreadsheets that list performance metrics that the FBI then relies upon to dispense bonuses to

these SACs.

These metrics appear to be arbitrarily assigned, and in some cases self-determined

by the SAC. This reward structure creates perverse incentives in which law-enforcement tools

and resources are expended for the financial enrichment of FBI leadership instead of a legitimate

law-enforcement basis.

Principles of Federal Prosecution, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 6 Fed. Sent. R. 317, 317 (1994) (Federal law

enforcement’s “priorities are designed to focus federal law enforcement efforts on those matters within federal

jurisdiction that are most deserving of federal attention and are most likely to be handled effectively at the federal

level.” (emphasis added)).

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).

See generally H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FBI WHISTLEBLOWERS: WHAT THEIR DISCLOSURES INDICATE ABOUT

THE

POLITICIZATION OF THE FBI AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT [hereinafter “FBI WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT”].

Transcribed Interview of Mr. Garret O’Boyle at 120 (Feb. 10, 2023) (hereinafter “O’Boyle Interview”).

Id.

Special Agent Garret O’Boyle explained to the Committee and Select Subcommittee that

he had concerns about the potential for abuse in this incentive structure, particularly as they

apply to surveillance techniques. He testified:

Q. And are you aware of these self-created performance

metrics?

A. So to some degree, I am. . . . And I think a large driving

factor in the FBI is to meet those metrics. And I think that

raises grave constitutional concerns to be saying to law

enforcement officers, you have to go and do X, Y, and Z so

the boss gets his bonus. Nobody comes out and says it that

way, but when you get the spreadsheet where—or the SAC

Excel spreadsheet is red in these categories, we’ve got to fix

it, we’ve got to do this and that to get it back up to green and

then to gold so he gets his bonus. Nobody is saying it that

way, but that certainly is what is implied.

Q. And what are the metrics?

A. There’s a wide range of them. . . . [O]ne that I do have

personal experience with is . . . Title III wiretaps, or FISAs,

or other sophisticated—sophisticated techniques. That’s

what they’re called. . . . [A]t the beginning of the year the

SAC’s metric might be, get three Title IIIs. And it’s like,

how do you know you’re going to get three? And what if you

don’t get three? Well, then you’re not marked gold in that

category. So I think that that leads to a pervasive culture of

not letting the case dictate where the investigation goes, but

it’s the manager or the agent pushing for a certain avenue of

where a case goes.

Indeed, O’Boyle recalled a specific instance in his career in which he and a co-case agent

were not-so-subtly impressed into the profit-seeking service of their then-SAC. He testified:

And me and my co-case agent, a [Task Force Officer] who had been

there for years, we had a meeting with my boss. It was Sonia Garcia

at the time. And we were talking about this Title III affidavit that

I’m writing—or that me and [Task Force Officer] are writing. And

we wrap up the meeting, and she says, you guys, I really need this

Title III. And it struck me as odd. So we walked out of the office.

And I was like, [Task Force Officer], can we go to the conference

room? And so we went in there and talked. And I was like, what did

she mean, like, I really need this Title III? And he started laughing.

And he’s like, you’ll see. . . . And he told me, like, there are metrics

Id. at 121.

that need to be met, and then your boss or their boss can write to

that, oh, while I was the supervisory resident or supervisory special

agent, I had a Title III on this case. And they can write to that on

what’s called an FD-954, which is . . . your internal resume that you

have to submit when you want to get promoted. And it’s like, oh,

she really needed that because it helps her get promoted. And then

it also helps the SAC because then he’s got a Title III for his Excel

spreadsheet. So he’s one Title III closer to being gold in that way

and then getting his bonus. And I would say, like, by and large—I

mean, a Title III, you listen to people’s phone calls. . . . [T]hat’s an

extreme measure to take. And now with the FBI saying, get this

arbitrary number of Title IIIs because then the big boss gets his

bonus? Like, that’s not how law enforcement should be working.

O’Boyle testified that although that is “not how law enforcement should be working,” it

was commonly understood in the FBI that special agents did well to meet these metrics so that

their bosses could receive a financial bonus.

The bonus structure was not only “common

knowledge,” but a source of humor and speculation within the Bureau.

George Hill, a former

FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst, testified to the Committee and Select Subcommittee that

SACs would joke about the bonus while FBI personnel would speculate about how much money

the SAC would receive as a bonus.

But as O’Boyle made clear, there is nothing funny about an

incentive structure that “leads to a pervasive culture of not letting the case dictate where the

investigation goes,” but allowing arbitrary metrics to guide the allocation of law-enforcement

assets and resources.

The pressure felt by field agents to hit metrics for their SACs even affected real-world

law enforcement operations in the field. Special Agent Stephen Friend testified that he once was

asked to “space out” arrests on different days so that the arrests would count as nine separate

data points. He explained:

Q. And as a special agent, when you were asked to either make

an arrest or push an arrest off for a couple months, would

you describe it as an environment of pressure to hit the

metrics?

A. Yes. I was told on one instance where there were nine

subjects on a case that if I arrested them all in the same day

it would count as one disruption statistic. But if I arrested

one each day for nine straight days, it would count as nine

statistics, so I should space out those arrests.

Id. at 121-22.

Id. at 124.

Transcribed Interview of Mr. George Hill at 56 (Feb. 7, 2023) (hereinafter “Hill Interview).

Id.

O’Boyle Interview at 121.

Q. So would you say that the pressure to hit the metrics, did it

cause you to make changes to how you were doing your law

enforcement duties?

A. Yes.

It is concerning—to the say the least—that these perverse financial incentives affect the

way in which FBI agents undertake their law enforcement duties. However, testimony from

another whistleblower, Staff Operations Specialist Marcus Allen, also highlighted the disturbing

practical effects of these incentives, which leads to unethical and inaccurate FBI documentation.

Specifically, Allen explained how the FBI management will demand that employees manipulate

time-keeping records to create the perception that a particular office is working more than it is on

a particular matter. As he explained:

A. So I’ve observed in the workplace, like, on more than one

year where it’s like, someone from management will come

down and they’ll say, “Everybody, TURK

this.” And so

all the investigators will be like, no matter what case it is,

it’s like, “Well, I guess we’re TURKing this now,” and

they’ll just literally all TURK that number, like, regardless

of what they may have really worked on. It seems to me

they’re trying to meet whatever the number that’s desired is,

you know, and if they’re short of that, then it’s like,

“Everybody, from this point forward, TURK this . . . .

O’Boyle’s testimony further supported Allen’s assertion about manipulating time-

keeping records to hit certain metrics, particularly in the context of domestic terrorism cases. In

his transcribed interview, O’Boyle explained:

Q. Given your experience with domestic terrorism cases, I want

to ask you about some information that the committee has

learned regarding domestic terrorism cases and domestic

violent extremism. So we have learned that the Biden

administration’s narrative about the FBI’s work on domestic

violent extremism — abbreviated as DVE — cases may be

misleading. We have received accusations that FBI agents

are bolstering the number of cases of DVEs to satisfy their

superiors. For example, one whistleblower claimed that,

because agents are not finding enough DVE cases, they are

Transcribed Interview of Mr. Stephen Friend at 126 (Feb. 15, 2023) (hereinafter “Friend Interview”).

“The FBI uses the Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system to record time spent by most FBI field

office personnel on various types of investigative matters.” The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation’s Reprioritization, Chapter 3: Resource Utilization and Casework, O

FFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.

(Sept. 2004),

https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0439/ch3.htm#:~:text=The%20FBI%20uses%20the%20Time,various%20types

%20of%20investigative%20matters.

Transcribed Interview of Mr. Marcus Allen at 63 (May 8, 2023) (hereinafter “Allen Interview”).

encouraged and incentivized to reclassify cases as DVE

cases, even though there’s minimal circumstantial evidence

to support the reclassification. Do you have any information

regarding the reclassification of cases as DVEs?

A. I would have to think about that further because I don’t

remember exactly where I heard this from. But in the FBI,

we classify our cases—we call it a TURK code. TURK is,

like, time, utilization, and record keeping. So there’s, like,

an alphanumeric code for every type of case, every type of

investigation you work . . . I can’t recall exactly, but I

learned at some point that FBI agents were being directed to

reclassify 170—I think it was 176 cases, so that would be

domestic cooperation with police—to reclassify any of those

into some type of domestic terrorism case. But, again, I don’t

remember if I heard that secondhand or if that was something

I learned at work. I guess along that same line, as a DT agent,

I encountered similar stat padding or case bolstering, in that

I had a case—and I’ll try not to get into too many details

because I think it might still be open, but I don’t know. It’s

a case I was trying to wrap up before my transfer. And truth

be told, it was one case. But the FBI had me open up four

different cases because they had me open a case for every

individual that I had an articulable, factual basis that there

may have been potential federal law being violated. And

when I first got these cases, I’m like because I initially—

they were transferred to me from another agent. And I think

it was, like, two at the time. And I asked my boss, I was like,

why do I have—these are the same. Like, everything I

wrote, . . . everything I did, I started putting into all four

cases because they were really just one case. Where, like, on

a criminal case, say you were working, like, a gang, which

this case was, I guess, like, a militia, if you’re working, like,

a gang, you have a case open on the gang, and you have a

subfile for each person in it. Like, John Doe one, two, and

three, they would all have their own subfile. Where in my

case, John Doe one, two, three, and four all had their own

separate case because then the FBI can—from my

perspective—the FBI can come back to Congress and say,

look at all the domestic terrorism we’ve investigated. Where,

really, I was working one case. But the FBI can then say,

well, he actually had four, and so we need you to give us

more money because look at how big of a threat all this

domestic terrorism is. So that’s just my personal experience

with that.

Q. So it was the usual practice that if there were multiple

individuals involved with one case, you may open a subfile

for each individual? Is that correct?

A. If you’re working traditional criminal matters, yes. But I

believe it’s policy on the CTD side to open up all these

separate cases, when in reality then that’s just—they’re just

obscuring the truth and the facts. Like, all my guys that I was

working on were related. They should have just been in one

case. But they weren’t because—

Q. Who gave you the directions, Mr. O’Boyle, to open four

cases in that matter rather than categorize all that conduct in

one case?

A. So, sir, I don’t know if anybody even gave me a specific

direction. It was more like, this is the policy . . . .

American citizens deserve to know that their tax dollars are being spent on necessary

investigations pervasive to their local communities. As this whistleblower testimony

demonstrates, the FBI is rife with unnecessary and potentially unethical enticements that direct

agents to not only lie about the types of cases on which they work but reward such FBI

leadership for such deception.

B. The FBI Is Reclassifying and Manufacturing Domestic Violent Extremism Cases to

Advance a Political Narrative that These Cases Are on the Rise.

Whistleblowers assert that the FBI pressured agents to reclassify cases as domestic

violent extremism (DVE), and even manufactured DVE cases where they may not otherwise

exist, while manipulating its case categorization system to feign a national problem. At a time

when the Biden Administration maintains that DVE is the “greatest threat” facing the United

States,

the FBI appears to be complicit in artificially supporting the Administration’s political

narrative.

The FBI defines a DVE as “an individual based and operating primarily within the United

States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other

foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful

acts of force or violence.”

According to the Biden Administration, investigations into DVEs

have increased “significantly” in recent years.

In August 2022, FBI Director Wray testified

O’Boyle Interview at 91-93.

The Way Forward on Homeland Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 117th Cong. (2021)

(statement of Hon. Alejandro Mayorkas, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.).

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

SSESSMENT ON DATA AND DOMESTIC TERRORISM AT 2, NOTE 3 (MAY 2021) [hereinafter “FBI STRATEGIC

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT”].

Threats to the Homeland: Evaluating the Landscape 20 Years After 9/11: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on

Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Dir., Fed.

before the Senate Judiciary Committee that “[t]he number of FBI investigations of suspected

DVEs has more than doubled since the spring of 2020.”

According to Hill, however, the pressure on FBI agents to meet metrics also contributed

to the manipulation of DVE data. Hill explained how then-Washington Field Office ASAC

Timothy Thibault and the FBI’s former Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division Jill

Sanborn pressured agents to move cases into the DVE category to hit self-created performance

metrics.

Indeed, according to Hill, Director Wray and Assistant Director Sanborn set a “tone”

to encourage agents “to identify opportunities where cases could be tagged as domestic terrorism

threats.”

In a transcribed interview with the Committee, however, Sanborn denied this

environment of pressure, testifying:

Q. And during your time at the FBI, are you aware of any

instances where an agent has been told to reclassify a case?

A. Not that I can recall, no.

Q. Any instance where an FBI agent was pressured to reclassify

a case?

A. Not that I can recall.

Q. During your time at the FBI, do you know if there is an—

was an initiative to prioritize DVE cases?

A. . . . But there is a process for prioritizing threats, and I think

it’s a yearly if not biyearly process, very mindful process,

that takes into account a lot of different things. And it’s very

intelligence based. It’s something that I believe is done well

on the heels of the lessons we learned from 9/11 to not base

prioritization just on volume of cases. So when I came in

that’s how priorities got set in field offices, was the squad

that had the most cases. And so I think this process that’s

rooted in intelligence then gives you how the cases should

be ranked—I mean, how the cases—how the threats should

be ranked. And going through that process definitely during

my time as [Assistant Director], and I believe I saw some of

this as [Executive Assistant Director], made the DVE threat

Bureau of Investigation); Hon. Merrick B. Garland, Atty Gen., Domestic Terrorism Policy Address at U.S. Dep’t of

Justice (June 15, 2021).

Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. at 2

(2022) (statement of Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation).

Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Dir.,

Fed. Bureau of Investigation (July 27, 2022); see also Letter from Reps. Jim Jordan & Mike Johnson, H. Comm. on

the Judiciary, to Ms. Jill Sanborn, Senior Dir. Of Geopolitical Strategy & Risk Analysis, Roku Inc. (Aug. 10, 2022).

Hill Interview at 18.

fall more elevated on that continuum than it maybe would’ve

been 5 years ago.

Still, Hill recalled that ASAC Thibault’s “level of excitement” at the prospect of targeting a

“growing segment of our population” as domestic terrorists was, in his words, near

“hysterical.”

According to whistleblower information, the FBI has manipulated the manner in which it

categorized January 6-related investigations to create a misleading narrative that domestic

terrorism is organically surging around the country. Ordinarily, the FBI characterizes and labels

cases according to the originating field office, with leads “cut” to other field offices for specific

assistance in that geographic location.

With January 6 cases, however, the FBI has not

followed its ordinary procedure, which would have resulted in the WFO leading the investigation

and categorizing the investigations as WFO cases.

In particular, Friend disclosed that:

Q. So, per policy in the DIOG, or the Domestic Investigations

and Operations Guide, is it correct that FBI agents ordinarily

label full investigations case files according to the

originating field office?

A. Yes.

***

Q. So, if the field office is cut a lead or sent a lead, is that field

office then referred to as the lead office under the DIOG?

A. Yes.

Q. So, for example, if a Federal crime occurs in Texas, would

the originating field office be in Texas?

A. Yes.

***

Transcribed Interview of Ms. Jill Sanborn at 25-6 (Feb. 1, 2023) (hereinafter “Sanborn Interview”).

Id. at 34-37, 99. Notably, Thibault resigned from the FBI in disgrace after credible allegations surfaced that he

attempted “to thwart a criminal investigation into Hunter Biden.” Caroline Downey, Top FBI Agent Resigns after

Allegedly Thwarting Hunter Biden Investigation: Report, N

AT’L. REV. (Aug. 30, 2022). He “was escorted out of the

Washington field office by at least two ‘headquarters-looking types.’” Id.

Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Dir.,

Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 19, 2022).

FBI WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT at 10.

Friend Interview at 12.

Id.

Q. And for full investigations opened into the events that

occurred at the Capitol on January 6, 2021, would the

originating field office for those investigations be the

Washington Field Office?

A. Yes.

Q. And if investigative actions outside of D.C. are required,

would or should the WFO case agent then cut a lead to the

appropriate FBI field offices?

A. Yes.

Q. And, following January 6th, to your knowledge, did the FBI

set up any kind of task force within headquarters or the WFO

to work on January 6th investigations?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you describe that task force? Was it in headquarters or

the WFO?

A. The WFO. And it was staffed by employees who worked in

WFO as well as TDY, temporary duty agents, from around

the Bureau.

Q. Do you know who was in charge of the task force?

A. I don’t.

Q. Okay. And since the events occurred in Washington, D.C.,

it is natural that the WFO would handle the investigations?

A. Yes.

Q. During your tenure at the Daytona Beach Resident Agency,

were you ever assigned January 6th cases?

A. Yes.

Q. And during your tenure at the FBI, did the FBI follow this

regular procedure with regards to January 6th investigations

for labeling cases?

A. No.

Q. How did the handling of January 6th investigations deviate

from the regular procedure?

A. We received leads from headquarters, from the task force

working out of Washington, D.C., with directives to carry

out certain investigative actions, in assumption that we were

going to be opening cases from our office as the originating

office. Then we would perform tasks and send that

information back to Washington, D.C., for their approval or

for their request for more work to be done and then

ultimately for their decision on how to pursue a case,

whether or not to prosecute it.

Friend also explained that although the field offices are carrying out the directives from

WFO, the agents in WFO are actually determining and approving the investigative tactics. He

explained this manner of running investigations was a deviation from standard practice. He

testified:

Q. . . . So, instead of following the regular case file

management procedure, the WFO is directing other field

offices to open full investigations, and then the WFO is

performing and approving the investigative work. Is that an

accurate characterization?

A. Yes.

Q. So, if January 6th cases are handled in this manner, does it

appear on paper that local field offices instead of the WFO

are the originating field offices?

A. Yes.

Q. And that deviates from the standard practice?

A. Yes.

Q. And, to your knowledge, is this only happening with January

6th cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How were your assigned January 6th cases handled? Were

they handled in this similar way, where the WFO would tell

you what to do and open cases?

Id. at 12-13.

A. Yes.

Q. Were you told or pressured by the WFO to open full

investigations?

A. We were told to open full investigations and that they would

populate them with paperwork or case file work that was

pertinent to that particular case.

Q. So, if you completed investigative steps, would you have to

report back to the WFO on what you had done?

A. Yes.

Q. And would they tell you if you needed to do more

investigating?

A. Yes.

Q. And what if you didn’t believe that there was enough of a

predicate to continue to investigate? Did you still have to

investigate?

A. I was told that we could push back as much as we wanted

but they would continue to send us additional requests to

perform more work.

Q. And “they” meaning agents at the WFO?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you ever provided any insight as to why January 6th

cases were handled in this manner?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was that insight that you received?

A. I was told that there was a coordination call very early on

after January 6th, during which there was representatives

from all around the country, and the question was posed as

to why this protocol was being followed, and that they were

told that it was to get buy in from the field.

***

Id. at 15-16.

Q. Do you know when this coordination call happened?

A. I was told it was in the immediate aftermath, so I was under

the belief that it was probably within a week or two.

Q. Did you get an understanding of who was on this

coordination call?

A. Yes. I was told that it was people from all around the Bureau

who were going to be charged with primarily investigating

the cases.

Q. Okay. So it included WFO people and agents from across

the country in different field offices?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you know what the substance — what was discussed

on that call?

A. That’s the only fact that I know that was discussed on that

particular call. But in my inquiries, I was told that these

coordination calls were going on quite frequently in the

aftermath of January 6th.

Friend explained that the FBI’s manner of handling January 6-related investigations in a

way that deviated from standard practice created a false impression with respect to the threat of

DVE nationwide. He testified:

Q. And, to your knowledge, does managing or labeling case

files in this way create a false and misleading narrative that

domestic violent extremism is increasing around the

country?

A. Yes.

Q. Does this, in turn, give the impression that the threat of DVE

is present in jurisdictions around the Nation even though the

cases all stem from the same related investigation?

A. Yes.

Id. at 16-17.

Id. at 17.

Worse yet, the FBI prioritized DVE cases over other criminal investigations such as those

involving child exploitation. As Friend testified:

Q. And you said that you became a member of the Joint

Terrorism Task Force at the Daytona Beach Resident

Agency in October of 2021. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it correct to say that you were reassigned from

investigating child exploitation cases to work on domestic

terrorism cases?

A. Yes.

Q. Were those cases specifically related to January 6th?

A. Yes.

Q. And how was that communicated to you?

A. There was a phone call from the assistant special agent in

charge to my supervisor at the time, and he said that the new

fiscal year approaching, that they were going to be

resourcing manpower differently and that I was going to be

reassigned from my current assignment to the JTTF. My

supervisor asked about the investigations that I was working,

and the ASAC said that those are to be considered a local

issue going forward.

From Friend’s testimony it is clear that although the local field offices appear to be

running the cases on paper, the WFO was directing the field office special agents to “open the

case” in their geographic area.

Meanwhile, the WFO was performing and approving “all of the

investigative work and paperwork for the casefile.”

Friend described how “there are active

criminal investigations of January 6th subjects in which I am listed as the ‘Case Agent,’ but have

not done any investigative work” and his supervisor “has not approved any paperwork within”

those investigative files.

This deviation from established practice has an obvious motive: it

allows the FBI to support the Biden Administration’s narrative that domestic terrorism is on the

rise by claiming that “[t]he FBI is a field-based law enforcement organization, and the vast

Id. at 8-9.

Id.

majority of our investigations should continue to be worked by our field offices,” while, in

reality, running the investigation from Washington.

By deviating from standard practice, the FBI has given itself a pretext to claim the DVE

threat is rising nationwide.

Friend disclosed:

The manipulative casefile practice creates false and misleading

crime statistics. Instead of hundreds of investigations stemming

from a single, black swan incident at the Capitol, FBI and DOJ

officials point to significant increases in domestic violent extremism

and terrorism around the United States.

In other words, the FBI’s case categorization creates the illusion that FBI field offices around the

country are investigating a groundswell of domestic terrorism cases, giving the impression that

the threat of DVE is present in jurisdictions across the nation. The reality is simpler: the cases all

stem from the same related investigation concerning the actions at the Capitol on January 6. This

scheme permits the FBI leadership to misleadingly point to “significant” increases in DVE

threats nationwide.

According to O’Boyle, the FBI classified “every single January 6th case . . . as a

domestic terrorism case.”

And yet hundreds of those cases were resolved as “petty crimes,”

such as “trespassing and disorderly conduct.”

O’Boyle testified:

[T]he FBI holds [the January 6th investigation] up as the biggest

investigation that it’s ever had. So if you’re categorizing all of them

as domestic terrorism cases, yeah, they would double. But I think

it’s kind of a misnomer to say that because the vast majority of those,

at least in my experience, we would get leads related to those, and

we’d work the leads and then send back to [WFO], who was

running—kind of running everything, like, hey, this lead, you know,

it’s unfounded or it is founded.

Letter from Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Hon. Michael Horowitz, Inspector

Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 6, 2019).

Hill Interview at 23 (noting that FBI leaders “need to create the perception that these cases are all over the country

and in numbers that the [Threat Review and Prioritization process] needs to reflect some sort of mitigation plan

attached to it”).

FBI WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT at 10-11.

See, e.g., Threats to the Homeland: Evaluating the Landscape 20 Years After 9/11: Hearing Before the S. Comm.

on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Dir., Fed.

Bureau of Investigation); see also Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before H. Comm. on

the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation);

Hon. Merrick B. Garland, Atty Gen., Domestic Terrorism Policy Address at U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 15, 2021).

(“The number of open FBI domestic terrorism investigations this year has increased significantly.”).

O’Boyle Interview at 124-25.

Alan Feuer, Prosecutors Move Quickly on Jan. 6 Cases, but One Big Question Remains, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5,

2022).

O’Boyle Interview at 104.

O’Boyle further recalled one example in which he was pressured to pursue an unreliable

and uncorroborated tip related to January 6 that normally would not have been pursued. He

explained:

Q. Do you know, did the WFO pressure other field offices to

keep January 6th cases open or open cases?

A. I would say they pressured us to open cases to some degree.

One example that I have personally . . . . But I received a

lead about someone based on an anonymous tip, and in law

enforcement anonymous tips don’t hold very much weight,

especially without evidence that you can corroborate pretty

easily. I wasn’t able to corroborate anything they said, even

after speaking with the person they alleged potential criminal

behavior of. While I’m trying to figure all that out, I get

another lead from the same agent who sent me that lead. And

they essentially tried to get me to violate policy or law.

***

And after talking to her, my mind was blown that she was

still trying to get me to do some legal process on the guy that

I got the anonymous tip on. Because there was no rational

explanation that anybody could come up with, especially

with the additional information I had found, that would have

permitted me to do legal process even if I wanted to. And so

I ended up writing that all up and denying it. But that was a

personal example for me where it was like, okay, this has

gone way off the rails here.

Similarly, Friend testified:

Q. . . . I want to go back to the treatment of these January 6

cases. You talked about information packets that the

Washington Field Office would send out around the country.

Could you give me a sense of the categories of evidence that

would be included in those packets?

A. It would have information with photographs of surveillance

footage tied to social media, facial recognition, to ensure that

it matched with the individual’s, say, their Facebook profile.

It would be GPS information for the person’s phone. And

that information was provided by the phone providers to the

FBI. And they were able to geolocate geo fence if that

Id. at 102-03.

Id.

phone was in the area. It included tips that came in through

the public at large. In the aftermath of January 6th, there was

a large push to get that information, so many, many people

made phone calls or provided electronic communications to

turn in who they thought were subjects. It could be anything

from—confidential human sources might be able to provide

some information. So that would all be assembled into a

packet and disseminated to the field to pursue

investigative—logical investigative action.

***

Q. And just so I understand this, in these packets, you observed

information regarding confidential human sources?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you explain what happened when you went and spoke

to that individual who there was no facial recognition

indicating they were in the Capitol?

A. Yes. It was an anonymous tip from Rhode Island. Facial

recognition was negative. The phone was negative. At that

point, I said, it’s probably it’s not worth resourcing because

we can’t pursue an investigation, even if the person

confesses to being there, because we don’t have a

complainant on this case. And I was told that, yeah, we got

those all the time, especially right after January 6, and you

have to go talk to them; otherwise, Washington is going to

keep kicking it back to us. So I went and talked to him and

knocked on his door, identified myself, and asked him if he

was at the Capitol, and he told me that he wasn’t because

that was the day of his son’s funeral. So I gave him my

business card and I left.

Likewise, with respect to manipulating the data on the January 6 investigation, Friend

testified:

A. By opening a separate case for each individual as opposed to

one case with however many subjects are involved, they’ve

turned one case into a thousand cases. And by spreading

them to the field they’ve given the impression that those

domestic terror cases are around the country when, in fact,

the subjects, if they committed any sort of violation or

Friend Interview at 107-08.

Id. at 108-09.

infraction, they committed a crime at the Capitol on one day

as opposed to being a cell that’s operating in El Paso or

Cleveland.

***

Q. And, to your knowledge, does managing or labeling case

files in this way create a false and misleading narrative that

domestic violent extremism is increasing around the

country?

A. Yes.

Q. Does this, in turn, give the impression that the threat of DVE

is present in jurisdictions around the Nation even though the

cases all stem from the same related investigation?

A. Yes.

***

Q. Do you agree that manipulating the case file system in this

way allows the FBI to support Director Wray’s

December 2019 assertion that the FBI is a, quote,

“field-based law enforcement organization,” end quote?

A. Yes.

By manipulating the classification of January 6 investigations, according to Hill, Director

Wray and FBI leadership “encourage[d] the use of DVE tags” and “create[d] the perception that

[DVE] cases are [on the rise] all over the country. . . .”

O’Boyle put a finer point on the FBI’s

manipulation of case files. When asked about the FBI’s deviation from practice related to the

January 6 investigation, he testified:

Q. And is this how cases are normally handled?

A. No. I’ve never seen that before.

Q. Why do you think the FBI is handling the cases in this

manner given your experience?

A. I think it goes back to making that threat appear larger than

Id. at 131.

Id. at 17.

Id. at 18.

Hill Interview at 23, 36.

it actually is, and then WFO kind of . . . being at the head of

everything to try to ensure, as best they can, how the

direction of a particular case will go.

Q. And so if the main event occurred in Washington, D.C., and

then now there’s cases opening across the country, would it

then look like there are domestic terrorism cases popping up

across the country if this is how the FBI is handling?

A. Yes, that is how it would look.

The nature of this manipulation has not been lost on the rank and file of the FBI. As

Friend testified:

Q. [W]hy did it concern you that the FBI was padding the stats

on the [January 6] cases with this practice you’ve testified to

of keeping matters open without any real law enforcement

utility?

A. For two reasons. I was worried that we were violating our

rules and individuals’ rights, and that could contribute to us

essentially losing righteous prosecution against an

individual, as well as being violative of their civil liberties.

And, secondly, I believe . . . that the FBI is supposed to exist

for maintaining law and order, and if we are creating the

illusion that domestic terrorism is on the rise around the

country, it’s going to make people nervous, and it’s going to

contribute to a very toxic environment where we might be

shifting the Overton window to the extent that half the

country might be cut out of a constructive dialogue.

This testimony from these FBI whistleblowers is concerning. The FBI is pressuring

agents to classify cases as DVE matters and manipulating data to advance a political narrative

that domestic extremism is on the rise—and that everyday Americans in neighborhoods around

the country are part of that growing threat. The FBI has diverted resources from investigating

violent criminal enterprises, major drug traffickers, and international sexual predators and human

traffickers to prioritize “domestic extremists”—roughly translated, according to the President’s

own words, as the half of the country that does not support his political views and policies.

This misallocation of law-enforcement priorities should concern all Americans.

O’Boyle Interview at 181.

Friend Interview at 47-48.

Remarks, The White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Continued Battle for the Soul of the Nation

(Sept. 1, 2022).

C. The FBI’s Washington Field Office Pressured the Boston Field Office to

Investigate Americans Solely for Traveling to Washington, D.C. on January 6.

The Committee has obtained information suggesting the FBI’s push to advance an

artificial narrative that domestic terrorism is on the rise is infringing on Americans’

constitutional liberties. From whistleblower disclosures to publicly available information, it

appears that with the newfound emphasis on fighting domestic violent extremism, the FBI sees

signs of domestic terrorism wherever it looks.

Retired Supervisory Intelligence Analyst Hill provided one insightful example.

According to Hill, two individuals organized a bus trip from Massachusetts to Washington, D.C.,

to attend a political rally in support of President Trump on January 6, 2021.

The group included

a total of 140 people on two buses.

The two organizers of the trip entered restricted areas in the

United States Capitol that day and, as a result, the FBI’s Boston Field Office (BFO) opened cases

against them for potentially violating federal law.

Rather than limiting the investigation to just

the two people who entered restricted areas of the Capitol, however, the WFO instructed the

BFO to open cases on all 140 individuals who attended the political rally.

As Hill testified to

the Committee:

WFO wanted us to open up a case on each and every one of those

140 individuals, to which the [Supervisory Special Agent] in Boston

said, “They were going to a political rally, which is First

Amendment-protected activity. No, we’re not starting cases on these

people.” To which they said, “Well, we’re going to call your SAC.”

And the SSA said, “Go right ahead.”. . . [T]o his credit, [the SSA]

said, no, we’re not opening up cases on people who went to a

rally . . . .

Hill further recounted that when the Boston office asked the WFO for video evidence that

the other 138 individuals were in the Captiol, the WFO informed the Boston agents that it could

not share the video out of fear it would disclose the identities of undercover officers in the

Capitol.

Hill elaborated:

And I forgot a key part. The SSA for CT2 said, “Happy to do it.

Show us where they were inside the Capitol, and we’ll look into it.”

To which WFO said, “We can’t show you those videos unless you

can tell us the exact time and place those individuals were inside the

Capitol.”

To which the SSA responded back – and I was privy to these

Hill Interview at 82.

Id.

Id. at 82-83.

conversations firsthand – “Why can’t you show us – why can’t you

just send us the – give us access to the 11,000 hours of video that’s

available?” “Because there may be” – may be – “UCs,” undercover

officers, “or CHSes,” confidential human sources, “on those videos

whose identity we need to protect.”

In a subsequent exchange with Chairman Jordan, Hill detailed the sequence of events. He

testified:

Q. So Washington Field Office contacts you and says, we want

to open up investigations on the two people who organized

these two buses –

A. And we did.

Q. – who were inside the Capitol.

A. Yes.

Q. And you said, fine, because they were inside the Capitol.

A. Because they were able to show us pictures of them inside

the Capitol.

Q. Definitive proof they were inside the Capitol.

A. Yes.

Q. So you open up investigations on them. And then

Washington Field Office asked you, we want you to look at

everyone who was on the bus who came to the rally?

A. Correct.

Q. You said, show us why –

A. Show us proof they were in the Capitol.

Q. – and you’d be happy to do it.

A. Yes.

Q. And then they said, we can’t show you proof.

A. Correct.

Id. at 82.

Q. And you asked, “Why can’t you show us proof?” Is that

correct? “Why can’t you show us proof?”

A. Either show us pictures or give us access to the videos, the

11,000 hours of video.

Q. Back up a second. The two who you opened cases up on the

initial two –

A. Those came through with pictures.

Q. So they had pictures of them –

A. Yeah.

Q. – inside the Capitol.

A. In the Capitol, yeah.

Q. Got it.

A. It was clear cut violation of the law.

Q. Got it. The other 140, they had no evidence, no proof that

they had actually violated the law and were inside the

Capitol.

A. They may have, but they refused to share it with us.

Q. Refused to share it with you. And then you said, we're not

going to open up an investigation –

A. Right, because all we had was they –

Q. Before you said that, you said, show us the proof, show us

the video or pictures, whatever you have. And they said, we

can’t.

A. Correct.

Q. And the reason they gave you was?

A. There may be UCs, undercovers, or CHSes, confidential

human sources, and we need to protect their identities.

Id. at 83-84.

Hill’s supervisor, Special Agent-in-Charge Joseph Bonavolonta, confirmed Hill’s account

about WFO asking Boston to open investigations on all 140 individuals. In a transcribed

interview with the Committee, Bonavolonta testified:

Q. . . . I’m going to read to you some testimony that we

received from Mr. Hill . . . only for the purpose of

potentially refreshing your recollection, to see if it, you

know, jogs your memory. Mr. Hill testified—and this is on

page 81 of his transcript—two individuals in Massachusetts

organized buses to go down to the rally, and Boston opened

up cases on those two individuals because we were shown

definitive evidence from WFO of them entering restricted

areas of the Capitol. On to page 82 of the transcript, [b]ut

those two individuals organized these buses, and there were

140 people on the buses, on the two buses. And WFO wanted

us to open up a case on each and every one of those 140

individuals, to which the SSA in Boston said, They were

going to a political rally, which is a First Amendment

protected activity, no, we’re not starting cases on these

people. To which they said, meaning WFO, Well, we’re

going to call your SAC, or your S A C, and the SSA said, Go

right ahead. Does that vignette, was that briefed to you?

A. So once again, the exact verbiage that came from George

Hill there, like, I, that I can’t recall if that’s exactly how it

went down. But, yes, the—the—when my team briefed me

on that one issue, one of the things they did communicate to

me was that because of that initial pushback about not

wanting to immediately conduct blanket interviews of all of

the 150 some odd passengers, absent [the two individuals

who entered restricted space], then, you know, that a

comment was made by somebody either out of headquarters

or WFO, I don’t know which one, that your SAC may be

getting a call.

Q. Okay.

A. But as we spoke about earlier, I never received any such call

or outreach.

Q. Okay. And do you know who in the WFO would’ve been

making that type of statement?

A. So it would have been somebody somewhat commensurate

to the line supervisor up in Boston. I just don’t know who.

Q. Okay. Hill’s testimony goes on, on page 82, Because when

you’re pushing back, you know, you want to make sure that

you have your six covered—I’m not sure what that means,

but—so the SAC and the ASAC were intimately aware of

these kinds of exchanges that were going on. And again, to

his credit, Joe Bonavolonta said, No, we’re not opening up

cases on people who went to a rally. And I forgot a key part,

the SSA for CT2 said, happy to do it . . . Does that jive with

your recollection?

A. Not—once again, just not the—not the verbiage that’s being

used or the quotes that are being attributed, but in totality, as

I’ve said before all along, the methodology used by the line

supervisor to either headquarters or WFO was simply, if you

have additional evidence or information that would — that

would justify us conducting interviews on certain

individuals, then provide it to us, and we will do it.

Bonavolonta also testified that while he was not briefed to “that level of specificity”

regarding Hill’s disclosure that the presence of undercover officers in the Capitol was the reason

the WFO withheld information from the Boston agents, he was aware “we were requesting

additional information to see if we could . . . if we in fact had enough of a predication” for

investigating.

Bonavolonta further testified:

Q. And are you aware of whether agents or analysts within the

Boston Field Office were asked to work on investigations

related to the events that occurred at the U.S. Capitol on

January 6th, 2021?

A. Yes.

Q. And about how many cases?

A. I really can’t give you a number in terms of the overall

number of cases.

Q. And was it your understanding that the agents within the

Boston Field Office were running the investigations?

A. No. The actual cases relative to January 6th were all

program managed and generated out of our Washington

Transcribed Interview of Mr. Joseph Bonavolonta at 71-2 (May 4, 2023) (hereinafter “Bonavolonta Interview”).

Id. at 74-75.

Field Office. And so, where our involvement would come

into play would be if a—you know, a package with the

requisite evidence in it that may have risen to the level of an

individual being charged with a certain crime related to

January 6th would be sent up to us and then worked in

conjunction with an agent in my office, as well as with a

AUSA within the district of Massachusetts. But then once

whether it was if it was for instance, an arrest warrant, that

arrest would be executed, and then the case would be—you

know, the subject would go down for an appearance in

Washington, and then that’s where it would be worked from

there, whether there was a guilty plea or a trial, it would all

be done down in Washington, D.C., not up in Boston.

Q. And, when you say program managed out of the Washington

Field Office or the WFO, did that mean the WFO was giving

your agents direction on what to do?

A I wouldn’t necessarily say “direction.” It was just more—it

was more a package that would be sent up with the requisite

evidence to execute in most cases an arrest warrant, and that

was it. It was pretty—it was very basic.

***

Q. And you said or one of your colleagues in the Boston Field

Office said that if you have additional evidence, we will take

it, and if it meets the DIOG, we’ll go out and interview these

people. Is that correct?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And subsequent to that, somebody from Washington came

back with some additional evidence on a specific finite

number of individuals and then you proceeded to do

investigative work on that finite group?

A. Correct.

O’Boyle similarly testified that the combination of financial incentives and political

considerations led the FBI’s January 6 investigation to go, in his words, “way off the rails.”

When asked to clarify this statement, O’Boyle indicated he was pressured by at least one agent

Id.at 10.

Id. at 22-23.

O’Boyle Interview at 127.

from the WFO to “violate policy [and] law” by initiating legal processes against at least one

citizen who was simply the subject of an anonymous tip.

O’Boyle testified:

Q. And when you say “legal process,” what are you referring

to?

A. So they were trying to get me to do the grand jury subpoenas,

when there was no rational way to conclude that the legal

process she wanted was in any way associated with the

anonymous tip . . . .

***

Q. . . . Could you explain?

A. So the initial tip I received from [the WFO] I did investigate

and did due diligence.

Q. Right.

A. And then the second tip, where then [the WFO is] asking me

to get legal process, when there wasn’t a rational link

between what [the WFO] wanted me to get the legal process

for from the one tip and associating it with the previous tip

[the WFO] had sent me the day or maybe 2 days prior.

Q. Okay. And so you declined, you didn’t seek legal process,

right?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. Were there any punitive actions against you for

declining to take that step?

A. No, but I think that’s only because I think I was very

meticulous in how I wrote it up, and after my boss read it, he

was like, “Huh.”

Q. Okay. So, at the end of the day, you exercised your

judgment, and you weren’t—there were no consequences for

that.

A. As far as I know.

Id. at 102-04.

Id. at 105.

Id. at 120-21.

Although O’Boyle did not face any punitive actions from the FBI relating to his refusal to

unlawfully seek legal process following a tip, his testimony is still shocking. Such testimony

confirms that the FBI was pressuring its agents to violate federal law to investigate American

citizens without adequate legal process. It is undoubtedly also concerning that O’Boyle feels he

avoided any punitive or adverse action from the FBI in this case only because he “was very

meticulous” in assessing the case and creating a paper trail to justify his refusal to follow a

directive from the WFO.

D. The FBI Gathered Conservatives’ Financial Records from Bank of America

Without Any Legal Process Following January 6.

Just like FBI whistleblowers O’Boyle and Friend, retired FBI Supervisory Intelligence

Analyst George Hill provided the Committee with detailed allegations of FBI civil liberties

abuses. Specifically, he testified that following the events at the Capitol on January 6, 2021,

Bank of America (BoA) gave the FBI’s Washington Field Office a list of individuals who had

made transactions in the D.C., Maryland, Virginia area with a BoA credit or debit card between

January 5 and January 7, 2021.

He also testified that individuals who had previously purchased

a firearm with a BoA product were elevated to the top of the list provided by BoA.

Specifically, Hill testified:

A. . . . The Bank of America, with no directive from the FBI,

data-mined its customer base. And they data-mined a date

range of 5 to 7 January [of 2021] any BOA customer who

used a BOA product. And by “BOA product,” I mean a debit

card or a credit card. They compiled that list. And then, on

top of that list, they put anyone who had purchased a firearm

during any date. So it was a huge list . . . .

***

Q. Was the list that Bank of America provided targeted just to

the D.C. area for those—

A. Yes.

Q. —dates?

A. Just the District and surrounding area, so, like, the NOVA

area.

Q. And the surrounding area.

Hill Interview at 74-75.

Id.

Id. at 74.

A. Yeah.

Q. And it’s anyone who used a Bank of America either debit or

credit card—

A. Right.

Q. —to conduct a transaction.

A Any transaction. To buy a hotdog. Doesn’t matter.

Q Okay. And then my understanding is that they created a

second list where that first list was prioritized based on

individuals that had purchased a firearm?

A They just basically just built on top of it, anybody who

committed a—you know—

Q A firearm purchase?

A. [T]hese are your priorities, these are your number one

individuals that you need to go after. Not only did they use

a BOA product in the District, but they’ve also purchased a

firearm at some point in time, any time.

Q. This list was provided then without any legal process to the

FBI?

A. Correct. So my understanding of the DIOG and amateur

assessment based on law is that, you know, if a citizen sees

a crime in commission, there’s nothing wrong with injecting

that and opening up a case. But, to my knowledge, you

know, using a debit card or a credit card in the District does

not provide adequate predication for the investigation of a

crime. So there was no legal process either asking for it or

— you know, from the Bureau or from DOJ or anybody.

Hill further testified:

Q. Mr. Hill, you described the process by which this Bank of

America data pull is lashed to data regarding firearm

purchases. What was the geographic envelope for those

firearm purchases?

Id. at 75-76.

A. They would had to have met both criteria: used a BOA

product in the District—but there was no geographic

framework if they had ever, ever bought a firearm.

Q. What about the firearm purchase as a feature of time? Did—

A. No, there was no time—there was no—

Q. So that—

A. That was not in the data range, date . . . But the gun purchase

could be anywhere—

Q. Anywhere, anytime. You could live—you could be a

resident of Iowa, be a BOA customer, purchased a shotgun

in 1999, go to the District, use your credit card to pay for a

hotel on January 5th and check out. You’re going to rise to

the top of that list . . . [w]ere there any other criteria, other

than the BOA transaction and the firearm purchase, that were

prerequisites?

A. No.

Hill’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Boston’s Special Agent-in-Charge

Joseph Bonavolonta, who testified that Boston’s JTTF Squad Supervisor, Chief Division

Counsel, and Special Agent-in-Charge of Counterterrorism brought the BoA data to his attention.

He further testified to the Committee and Select Subcommittee:

Q. . . . And are you aware of information coming from Bank of

America that was sent to the FBI?

A. I am, yes.

Q. [A]re you aware of the existence of that information on the

FBI systems?

A. I can’t tell you where it is housed on FBI systems or what

the current status is, but I am aware of information that was

forwarded to us related to a Bank of America lead, yes.

***

Q. And why did they bring this information to your attention?

Id. at 76-77.

Bonavolonta Interview at 11.

A. So they brought the information to my attention, first and

foremost, to make me aware that a lead had been sent to our

office from a unit within FBI Headquarters that fell under

the Office of Private Sector. And the lead, the lead itself, was

for informational purposes only. There was no directive in

the lead to do anything . . . from an investigation standpoint.

However, in the body of the lead, there was an information

that was provided by Bank of America following a certain

number of criteria that in essence aggregated a list of

individuals that were supposedly living up in the New

England area who . . . either had potentially

made . . . certain credit card purchases . . . for hotel

reservations or plane tickets, or potential purchases at certain

gun stores in and around . . . January 6th or planned for the

inauguration date, like around January 20th, like in that

timeframe. I’m speaking in generalities just because simply

I can’t recall the exact nature of the criteria, but it was

something to that effect. And so my team brought that to my

attention just to make me aware of it and to . . . just to see if

there was going to be any request to actually . . . do

something from an investigative measure on these

individuals. So I reviewed the lead, and it was very clear in

the lead that there was not a request to engage with anybody.

Or we weren’t being directed to do anything. But what I did

on my own was . . . at the time, I was a co-chair of the SAC

Advisory Committee, and I reached out to my colleague who

was the SAC out of Springfield, Illinois, who was the chair

of the SAC Advisory Committee. So we worked together on

that just to see if he had been aware of this. And then we

wound up together proactively communicating with the

assistant director of the Counterterrorism Division [Jill

Sanborn] at headquarters at the time just . . . to see if they

were aware that this lead had at least been sent to two field

offices. And the only knowledge I had at the time, obviously,

was that it was sent to Boston, and it had been sent to

Springfield. And we just wanted to make Counterterrorism

Division aware of that just to let them know that we, based

on the information provided in the lead, . . . we were not

planning on doing anything with that information . . . and

just so that Counterterrorism Division could be aware as well

if in the event that it had been sent to other field

offices . . . for awareness. And that was really my level of

involvement with that particular lead.

***

Id. at 13.

Q. And it was also represented to us that individuals were

prioritized on that list if they had a firearms purchase. Does

that match your recollection?

A. So . . . I don’t have any knowledge of anybody being

prioritized over a firearm purchase, but in one of the criteria

that was in there in terms of Bank of America’s data, it was

related to purchases that had been made at either gun shops

or, you know, stores that would sell firearms, but I can’t

speak to in terms of if any individual on that list was actually

prioritized, or at least that wasn’t conveyed to me.

Q. And did the gun purchases have to be recent, or could it have

been at any time in the past?

A. That I just don’t know.

Q. And how many individuals were included on that list that

were in the jurisdiction of the Boston Division?

A. Approximately 6 or 7, or around that number.

This testimony is highly alarming. The FBI seemingly worked with a major financial

institution to receive, without legal process, financial records about Americans who used credit

or debit card to purchase hotels, flights, or firearms in close proximity to January 6, 2021. This

invasion of the privacy of American citizens in this manner is decidedly concerning.

E. Line Agents Opposed Attorney General Garland’s Memorandum Directing

Federal Law Enforcement Resources Against Parents.

As the radical left pushed its woke agenda on America’s children, parents across the

country started speaking out at school board meetings against critical race theory, unscientific

mask mandates, transgender ideology in the classroom and bathroom, and anti-America

curricula. Concerned parents were vocal and unafraid in their opposition to this indoctrination.

The National School Boards Association (NSBA) and the Biden Administration, however, could

not abide this growing parental rights revolution and colluded to create a pretext—articulated in

an October 4 memorandum from Attorney General Garland—to use the federal law-enforcement

apparatus to silence parents.

The FBI was a witting participant in the Administration’s anti-parent endeavor. A press

release accompanying the Attorney General’s memorandum highlighted the FBI’s National

Id. at 17.

Memorandum from Hon. Merrick Garland, Atty Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Partnership Among Federal, State,

Local, Tribal, And Territorial Law Enforcement to Address Threats Against School Administrators, Board

Members, Teachers, and Staff (Oct. 4, 2021).

Threat Operations Center for tips about parents at school board meetings.

On October 20,

2021, the FBI operationalized Attorney General Garland’s directives. The FBI’s Assistant

Director for the Counterterrorism Division and the Assistant Director for the Criminal Division

sent an email to SACs around the country referencing the Attorney General’s October 4 directive

and notifying FBI personnel about a new “threat tag” created to apply to school board

investigations.

The FBI then began to open investigations with the EDUOFFICIALS threat tag

across the nation and established case files on dozens of parents with information that included

their political views and the application of this “threat tag” simply because they exercised their

fundamental constitutional right to speak.

The FBI informed the Committee that, between October 14, 2021, and the end of January

2023, the FBI applied the EDUOFFICIALS threat tag to “approximately 25” cases—only one of

which “subsequently resulted in the opening of a Full Investigation.”

Additionally, the FBI

stated that the majority of these 25 cases “were referred to state and local law enforcement, and

the vast majority—all but one—have been closed at the FBI level.”

The FBI also provided that

17 of the 25 cases “were assigned to the [FBI’s] Criminal Investigative Division; six were

assigned to the Counterterrorism Division; and the remaining two were assigned to the Weapons

of Mass Destruction Directorate . . . .”

In other words, the FBI’s disclosure confirmed

whistleblower allegations that the FBI had misused criminal and counterterrorism resources

against parents attending school board meetings.

Despite the inexplicable willingness of FBI leadership to use federal law enforcement and

counterterrorism resources to investigate parents, it is clear that some brave FBI agents in local

field offices saw this memorandum for what it was—weaponization of the federal law

enforcement community against moms and dads speaking up about their children’s education.

Whistleblower testimony from O’Boyle and Friend details the “shock and surprise” that line

agents had when learning of the memorandum and the Attorney General’s directive to target

parents.

1. Special Agent O’Boyle Was “Stunned” to Learn that Attorney General

Garland Intended to Pursue Concerned Parents for Investigation.

On October 4, 2021, Attorney General Garland issued a memorandum that directed the

FBI and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to address the “disturbing spike in harassment, intimidation, and

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Addresses Violent Threats Against School Officials and

Teachers (Oct. 4, 2021).

E-mail from Mr. Carlton Peeples, Deputy Assistant Dir., Criminal Investigative Div., Fed. Bureau of

Investigation, to FBI_SACS (Oct. 20, 2021).

See Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan and Rep. Mike Johnson, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Hon. Merrick Garland,

Atty Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 11, 2022).

Letter from Mr. Christopher Dunham, Acting Asst. Dir., Office of Cong. Affairs, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to

Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Jud. (Mar. 1, 2023).

Id.

See O’Boyle Interview at 78, 85.

Id. at 81.

threats of violence” at school board meetings.

O’Boyle testified to the Committee about his

reaction to the memorandum and that of his colleagues. O’Boyle recalled that he was “stunned”

to learn “that the highest-ranking law enforcement official in the country would publish

something like that to the workforce.”

He viewed “the content and overall direction” of the

memorandum to be “leading towards targeting parents for speaking up about their children’s

education.”

As a former police officer, he found it “most striking at first” that “such a high-

ranking federal official” would use “federal law enforcement to hone in on” an area that is

typically addressed by local law enforcement.

O’Boyle also shared the reaction of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) at the Wichita

Resident Agency, Sean Fitzgerald. O’Boyle recalled SSA Fitzgerald, whom O’Boyle reported to,

stating “we will not be going to school board meetings in this office.”

Fitzgerald’s reaction to

the memorandum is not surprising to O’Boyle. As O’Boyle put it, “There’s nothing that I know

of, based on my training and experience in the FBI, that brings this to a level of federal

concern.”

On October 20, 2021, in response to the Attorney General’s October 4 directive, FBI

Counterterrorism and Criminal leadership in Washington created the EDUOFFICIALS threat tag

to track and monitor school board-related investigations.

O’Boyle testified that the creation of

the EDUOFFICIALS threat tag was “troubling” in that both the Criminal Investigative Division

and Counterterrorism Division had signed off on the threat tag.

Particularly, O’Boyle

questioned why federal law enforcement would be involved in local law enforcement matters,

and stated that federal law enforcement involvement would “[a]bsolutely . . . chill parents from

exercising their First Amendment right.”

O’Boyle testified:

Q. And what was your reaction to seeing this EDUOFFICIALS

threat tag on the news?

A. Again, it was shock and surprise, especially—so Carlton

Peeples was in charge of the Criminal Investigative

Division, but also as part of that email was, I believe,

Timothy Langan, who was from the Counterterrorism

Division. And it was already surprising that the FBI’s CID

would be involved in something like this, but then to have

Memorandum from Hon. Merrick Garland, Atty Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Partnership Among Federal, State,

Local, Tribal, And Territorial Law Enforcement to Address Threats Against School Administrators, Board

Members, Teachers, and Staff (Oct. 4, 2021).

O’Boyle Interview at 78-79.

Id.

Id. at 78-79.

Id. at 79.

Id. at 86.

E-mail from Mr. Carlton Peeples, Deputy Assistant Dir., Criminal Investigative Div., Fed. Bureau of

Investigation, to FBI_SACS (Oct. 20, 2021).

O’Boyle Interview at 81.

Id. at 82.

both CID and CTD, the Counterterrorism Division, sign off

on a threat tag like that was troubling to say the least.

Q. And just like the memorandum, did agents and employees

within your office discuss their reaction to hearing the news

of the EDUOFFICIALS threat tag?

A. It is something we discussed just at the squad level, [task

force officers] and agents, which I would say, in my

experience, everybody I talked to about it was—had a

similar reaction as me, like, why are we inserting ourself into

this type of matter?

Q. Were you involved with any official conversations or

correspondence about the creation of the EDUOFFICIALS

threat tag?

A. No.

Q. And given your law enforcement background and your work

at the FBI — or I guess when you were at the FBI—did you

have any knowledge of or participate in any investigations

that were labeled with the EDUOFFICIALS threat tag?

A. No.

Q Are you generally aware that the FBI did in fact use that

threat tag?

A. I am.

Q. And are you aware that several parents were investigated by

the FBI for protected First Amendment activity?

A. I am.

Q. Given your law enforcement background and your work in

the FBI, does this concern you?

A. It does.

Q. And do you think, given your background, does knowing

that you could be investigated by the FBI for speaking up at

your child’s school board meeting, do you think that would

chill parents from exercising their First Amendment right?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Given your law enforcement background and your work at

the FBI, does the EDUOFFICIALS threat tag have any law

enforcement utility? Is there any reason to have it?

A. I don’t believe so.

Significantly, none of the veteran FBI employees interviewed by the Committee to date

could articulate a law enforcement utility for the threat tag.

2. Field Agents Viewed Attorney General Garland’s Pursuit of Concerned

Parents as a Chill on Parents’ Protected First Amendment Activity.

This infringement upon parents’ constitutionally protected activity was evident to special

agents in the field. In his transcribed interview with the Committee, Friend described how he was

directed to surveil parents at an anticipated “contentious” school board meeting in an effort to

connect January 6 subjects to the EDUOFFICIALS threat tag.

100

As Friend recounted, his

supervisor at the time ordered Friend and another agent to go to the location of a local school

board meeting.

101

As Friend testified:

Q. So part of the pressure campaign, as you’ve testified, were

these phone calls. Other than phone calls, was there any

other medium in which that pressure campaign manifested?

Emails? Directives? Other information?

A. I didn’t receive emails. I know that there was probably

Instant Message within the FBI, because [a senior agent in

our office] was corresponding with [the WFO] that way a

lot. And there were communications, I know, for one group

that they said they wanted surveillance done on them

because they had been talking in online forums, so I know

they were being monitored. And they wanted us to surveil

them to a school board meeting.

Q. What more can you tell us about that?

A. There was an anticipated very—going to be a very

contentious school board meeting in Flagler County,

because there had been some disturbing books that had been

found in the library, and a lot of parents were displeased, and

some of these individuals were going to go attend the

Id. at 81-82.

Id. at 82; see also Sanborn Interview at 91.

100

Friend Interview at 111, 127.

101

Id.

meeting. And we were asked to surveil them to the meeting.

And then, once we arrived, we kind of looked around and

said, this looks bad. It was right after the EDU threat tag had

emerged. They told us to get out before we were identified

as Federal agents.

102

In his interview, Friend noted that he had concerns about surveilling parents at school

board meetings, believing this could chill parents’ exercise of their First Amendment rights.

103

fact, Friend testified that “I appeared at a school board meeting in September, so I was a little bit

humored by the fact that I might be investigating myself.”

104

He noted that his colleagues even

teased him about this fact when they discussed the Attorney General’s memorandum.

105

Friend

stated that local law enforcement agencies were capable of handling any issues that might arise

at school board meetings, and local law enforcement should properly handle those matters.

106

testified that his colleagues had a similar dismissive reaction to the memorandum, stating, “We

didn’t take it seriously to the point where we were going to pursue investigations.”

107

This position was not just held by whistleblowers and their colleagues. It was apparently

shared by the field and local law enforcement. In an initial set of documents produced to the

Committee pursuant to a subpoena, the Justice Department’s own documents demonstrate that

there was no compelling nationwide law-enforcement justification for the Attorney General’s

directive or the Department components’ execution thereof.

108

After surveying local law

enforcement, U.S. Attorney’s offices around the country reported back to Main Justice that there

was no legitimate law-enforcement basis for the Attorney General’s directive to use federal law-

enforcement and counterterrorism resources to investigate school board-related threats.

109

addition, in reports back to Main Justice, many of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices noted that their

local law-enforcement partners opposed federal intervention at local school board meetings.

110

Similarly, Allen testified:

Q. Do you recall, subject to this memorandum, an email sent by

Carlton Peeples, who was the Deputy Assistant Director of

the Criminal Investigative Division, also in October of 2021,

to announce the creation of an “EDUOFFICIALS” threat

tag?

102

Id. at 110-11.

103

Id. at 128.

104

Id. at 121.

105

Id. at 128.

106

Id. at 121-22.

107

Id. at 122.

108

In fact, Attorney General Garland admitted as much in his October 2021 testimony to the Committee, conceding

that the National School Boards Association letter was the only basis for the Department’s actions. See Oversight of

the United States Department of Justice: Hearing Before the H. comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. at 68 (2021)

(testimony from Hon. Merrick Garland, Atty Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).

109

Interim Staff Report, H. Comm. on the Judiciary & Select Subcomm. on the Weaponization of the Fed. Gov’t, A

“Manufactured” Issue and “Misapplied” Priorities: Subpoenaed Documents show No Legitimate Basis for the

Attorney General’s Anti-Parent Memo (Mar. 21, 2023) (hereinafter “School Board Report”).

110

Id.

A. I do remember seeing an email about a threat tag having to

do with schools. I can’t recall if that was the specific threat

tag that I saw on the email, but I do remember there being a

creation of a threat tag and some people having ire about it

in the squad area.

Q. When you say some people had ire about it, what do you

mean?

A. I mean, like, verbal responses like, “What, are we going

after, like, people at school like, parents at school board

meetings now?” Statements to that effect.

111

***

Q. And when you talked about, you know, individuals

expressing ire within the JTTF squad area . . . were those

individuals special agents . . . ?

A. Yes . . . [i]t was a combination of both. People were like,

“Like, what is this? Like, this is ridiculous.”

Q Did they think it was a waste of FBI resources?

A Yes.

Q Was it your understanding and the understanding that you

could tell from the individuals of the JTTF squad were they

under the impression that this was a local law enforcement

issue?

A I don’t know what their official, you know, motivation was.

I just know that they had ire with the threat tag and

comments of the nature of, “What are we doing, going after

parents now?” You know, almost like a ridiculousness, you

know?

Q Would you say that the reaction among the JTTF squad to

the “EDUOFFICIALS” threat tag, was it negative?

A I would say yes.

Q Did you share that ire that your colleagues expressed?

111

Allen Interview at 58.

A I thought it was concerning. You know, I thought it was very

concerning.

Q And did you believe that the FBI should be using

counterterrorism resources on this issue?

A No.

112

According to Friend, the school board memorandum and the directives he had to surveil

parents were consistent with the demand to show that DVE cases are on the rise around the

country.

113

Friend testified to his belief that he and his fellow agents were told to surveil parents

“in order to meet the metrics that we have in order to show that we’re a successful agency.”

114

Friend recognized, rightly, that they were overstepping their bounds and infringing on parents’

constitutional rights.

115

112

Id. at 59-60.

113

School Board Report, supra note 1099, at 123.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 128.

II. FBI Leaders Weaponized the Security Clearance Adjudication Process Against

Whistleblowers in Retaliation for Blowing the Whistle.

Whistleblower testimony makes clear that the FBI rid itself of employees who dared to

speak out against FBI leadership or to raise good-faith concerns about FBI operations. The FBI

has taken personnel actions against whistleblowers who raised concerns within the Bureau and,

later, to Congress. In several instances—Friend, O’Boyle, and Allen—the FBI weaponized the

security clearance adjudication process to silence employees who fight against the politicized

“rot” within the FBI leadership. Because a security clearance is necessary to work at the FBI,

revoking or suspending an agent’s security clearance effectively indefinitely suspends the agent

and leaves the agent to languish in an unpaid purgatory.

This section details whistleblower testimony about the retaliation they have faced at the

hands of the FBI. Despite FBI statements that it is “committed to addressing misconduct head-

on” and that it is “taking considerable steps to ensure that employees are aware of whistleblower

protections,” the reality is otherwise.

116

As Friend explained, the FBI does all this in a way that

“creates an impression that [whistleblowing] is frowned upon.”

117

The FBI’s actions against

whistleblower employees, rather than its words, reveal how the FBI leadership truly views

whistleblowing.

A. Stephen Friend Was Suspended Without Pay After Questioning the FBI’s Handling

of DVE Cases and Expressing Concern about January 6 Tactics.

The FBI retaliated against Friend after he expressed concerns about how DVE cases were

being labeled and managed, the excessive force used in apprehending January 6 subjects, and for

making protected disclosures to Congress.

118

Friend testified:

Q. And were you ever told or notified that the FBI SWAT team

would be used during search and arrest warrants for January

6th subjects?

A. Yes.

Q. Did that concern you?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did the plans for the execution of these warrants

concern you?

A. Because the subject of the arrest warrant had been in

communication with the FBI at that point and had expressed

a willingness to cooperate with the FBI. And, in my

116

Id. at 106.

117

Id.

118

Friend interview at 20, 22, 26-27, 30.

experience in dealing with subjects of crimes and bringing

them into custody, the FBI tends to use the least amount of

force necessary to do that safely, and I felt that the use of

SWAT, and coming from my background of being a SWAT

team member, I felt that that was an unnecessary tool to use

for that particular individual.

Q. So the subject of the warrant that the SWAT team was going

to be used for was cooperating with the FBI. Is that your

understanding?

A. Yes.

Q. And had mentioned a willingness to come in

voluntarily . . . ?

A. Yes.

Q. . . . And in your experience working on criminal cases and

SWAT teams, you said that the FBI normally uses the least

intrusive methods. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that per FBI or DOJ policy?

A. I don’t know what policy. I just know that that is the general

approach that we always used.

Q. Can you explain some of the less intrusive methods that

might be used for a subject who is cooperating with the FBI

and has said that they’re willing to come in?

A. You can call the individual and ask them to surrender. You

can issue a summons. You can contact their attorney, if

they’re represented, and ask them to surrender. You can ask

for local law enforcement to execute an arrest warrant. You

can use surveillance resources to interdict an individual

while they’re traveling and away from their home base of

operations.

Q. And, to your knowledge, none of these were used for the

January 6th subjects that you were tasked with executing

search and arrest warrants for?

A. Not on the individual SWAT was going to be used for, no.

Q. Did you raise these concerns to your direct supervisor?

A Yes.

119

***

Q. And what did you disclose to [your direct supervisor]?

A. I raised my concerns about the use of the SWAT team for

the arrest. I also raised my concerns about the departures

from the DIOG with regards to how the cases were being

managed and told him that I believed that it was to

manipulate the crime statistics. And I also said that I

believed that we were infringing on individuals’ Sixth

Amendment rights.

120

***

Q. Okay. And how did [he] respond to your concerns?

A. He said that—he agreed that there was not a lot of work to

be done on JTTF and that he was actually going to lobby to

move me back into working child pornography

investigations in the next fiscal year. He told me that he was

concerned that he was doing file reviews on cases that none

of his people in his—none of his subordinates were actually

doing work on. And he then suggested that I might want to

speak to the employee assistance program for counseling;

and then asked me, if he brought my concerns up the chain

of command, how they thought—how I believed that they

would respond to that, and said that I had a good reputation

and that my career could be in jeopardy if I wanted to beg

out of participating in the upcoming arrest and searches.

121

***

Q. And so is it fair to say that you had two kind of tranches of

concerns: You had one about the DIOG violations stemming

from how the investigations were being labeled, and then a

separate concern about the use of SWAT team for one of the

January 6th subjects who had been cooperating with the

FBI? Is that correct?

119

Id. at 18-20.

120

Id. at 20.

121

Id. at 20-21.

A. Yes.

Q. And you raised both of those concerns to [your direct

supervisor]?

A. Yes.

Q. Who did you raise your concerns to next?

A. I was contacted by one of the assistant special agents in

charge of my office . . . and asked to attend a meeting with

him and another [assistant special agent in charge]. And [he

contacted me] on August 22nd in the evening, and I went

and attended that meeting the following day, on the 23rd.

122

***

Q. And how did [the two assistant special agents in charge]

respond to your concerns?

A. They pushed back on my concerns. They said that I had the

right to raise my concerns, but I had to follow through on the

orders that I was given to do.

Q. During your conversation with [the two assistant special

agents in charge], did you ever refuse to participate in the

warrants?

A. I told them that I didn’t want to and that, if assigned to, I

would have to consider not going, but I would call ahead if

that was going to be the case.

Q. And did you raise both your concerns about the labeling of

the January 6th investigations as well as the use of the

SWAT team?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you ever participate in any of the operations for the

executions of the warrants on the January 6th subjects?

A. I didn’t have the opportunity to.

Q. Why didn’t you have the opportunity to?

122

Id. at 22.

A. Following my meeting, I received an email from ASAC

Markovski telling me that I was ordered to not come to work

the following day and that I was going to be considered

absent without leave.

Q. So they ordered you to be on AWOL status? Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. How long were you on AWOL status?

A. One day, August 24th.

Q. And they never gave you the opportunity to come into the

office on that day?

A. No.

Q. When did you go back into the office?

A. August 25th. I emailed my supervisor, Greg Federico, in the

evening on the 24th and asked him if I could come back the

following day, and he said I could.

Q. Okay. And so, following your AWOL status, did you raise

your concerns with anyone else?

A. Yes.

Q. And who was that?

A. I spoke to the special agent in charge of the Jacksonville

Field Office, Sherri Onks.

Q. And what did you tell Special Agent in Charge Onks?

A. The same concerns that I had that I had raised with Greg

Federico, Sean Ryan, and Coult Markovski . . . [m]y

conversation with her was not as lengthy as it was with the

ASACs. I essentially told her that my feelings on the matter

were not changed after being placed AWOL and that I had

concerns about the constitutionality of what we were doing.

Q. And how did she respond to those concerns?

A. She told me that I represented a very fringe belief within the

FBI and that I needed to question whether or not I wanted to

have a future with the agency.

123

Shortly thereafter, as Friend recounted, when he arrived at work on September 19, 2022, four

officials from his office, including the chief security officer, met him and took his badge,

credentials, firearms, and all FBI property.

124

Friend testified:

They said that—they issued me a letter from Human Resources

Division, signed by Executive Assistant Director Jen Moore,

detailing the rationale for suspending my security clearance. And

without a security clearance, I can’t work in an FBI space and I can’t

fulfill my duties as a special agent, so I was suspended indefinitely.

I was allowed to exhaust my accrued leave time. And they gave me

a mechanism to—if I wanted to use sick time, it would need

justification from a doctor. And I was given paperwork to seek

outside employment if I wanted to, and escorted from the

building.

125

When asked about his reaction to the suspension, Friend testified:

Q. What was your reaction when you were suspended?

A. In the immediate aftermath, I called my wife to come pick

me up, and that was pretty disturbing for her. She had a

tumor removed from her spine a few weeks before that, and

she was not actually supposed to be driving. So she had to

come and drive me with a back brace on home. And then, at

that point, I started to communicate with my attorneys about,

you know, what to do as far as bringing my concerns to the

OIG and to the Office of Special Counsel and to Congress.

So we drafted a formal complaint and submitted that to all

three.

Q. And have you had any communication with your colleagues

from the Daytona Beach Resident Agency since your

suspension?

A. I have one friend who is now a former task force officer. He

was not assigned to the JTTF. He was assigned to the Safe

Streets Task Force. And he and I are friends, and we go to

the gun range together . . . [a]nd the secretary of the office,

123

Id. at 22-24.

124

Id. at 27.

125

Id.

she sends me text messages just of greetings and hello. But

nobody else from the office.

Q. What was the reaction of your colleagues when they learned

that you had been suspended?

A. I can only say what my task force friend said, and he said

that everybody just kind of went along with whatever the

proceedings were but that, in the aftermath, the office has

been extremely reticent to do anything. They don’t want to

draw attention to the office. So the SSRA Federico is sort of

nixing anything operational at this point.

Q. And when you say that people are hesitant to take actions,

what do you mean by that?

A. Nobody ever got fired for doing nothing . . . [s]o it’s pretty

easy to extend an investigation out long, as opposed to being

more aggressive in your investigative tactics that you use,

and it’s better to let the dust clear and settle around my

situation before you draw a spotlight to yourself.

Q. And do you believe that you were retaliated against by the

FBI for making protected disclosures to Congress?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you believe some of your colleagues, some of their

hesitance is that they’re nervous that they will be retaliated

against for speaking up?

A. Yes.

126

The retaliation did not end with Friend’s indefinite suspension. Despite informing Friend

that he could seek outside employment, the FBI refused to sign off on his requests to obtain it or

to provide him with the documents necessary for other employment. He testified:

Q. Did you take any steps to seek outside employment?

A. I submitted two FD-331s requesting outside employment.

The first one was rejected. And the second one I submitted

with also a caveat that I requested my training records, which

the FBI has yet to furnish me.

Q. So the first form that was rejected, who rejected that?

126

Id. at 29-30.

A. I was told that it was rejected by the executive management

of the Jacksonville Field Office.

Q. Did you get a reason for why it was rejected?

A. No.

Q. And then you submitted a second form for outside

employment and asked for records. What records did you

request?

A. I’m seeking my firearms training records as well as my

training records in general to prove my employment. Both of

those are necessary to gain employment from the second

outside entity. That’s not the first request of those records

that I’ve made either.

Q. . . . And have they given you the requested records?

A. No.

Q. Do you know why they have not given you the records?

A. No, I don’t.

Q. Who has been denying your request to obtain your records?

A. I made a request to the firearms training unit and sent an

email to their general counsel. And I sent the second request

for outside employment to the chief security officer of

Jacksonville Division.

Q. . . . And do you think this is just another episode of

retaliation, by not giving you your records?

A. Yes.

127

Coincidentally, Jennifer Moore, who serves as the Executive Assistant Director of the FBI’s

Human Resources Branch, testified that the agency’s failure to give Mr. Friend his records was a

“mistake” that she “owned.”

128

Ms. Moore specifically testified:

127

Id at 32-33.

128

Transcribed Interview of Ms. Jennifer Leigh Moore at 119-20 (Apr. 24, 2023) (hereinafter “Moore Interview”).

Q. That wasn’t done intentionally. What happened to Mr.

Friend wasn’t done intentionally. These are just all

coincidences?

A. I’m not sure what you’re referring to that happened to Mr.

Friend.

Q Mr. Friend, where you denied his firearms training

documents . . . .

A We did, and I owned that. That was a mistake . . . [m]istakes

happen when you have a 37,000 employee organization.

129

***

Q. So it was a mistake not to give Mr. Friend his training

records that he requested[?]

A. Yes, sir.

130

Nevertheless, the FBI knew exactly what it was doing when it suspended Friend’s

security clearance. The Bureau suspended it as retaliation for Friend making protected

whistleblower disclosures to Congress.

131

Without an active security clearance, he could no

longer work as an FBI agent. As a husband and father, Friend needed to work to earn income.

When asked how his suspension affected his family, Friend testified:

Q. And how has the FBI’s retaliation against you affected you

and your family?

A. Well, it’s very unusual. My household, I have two young

children, and they have asked, you know, why I’m not going

to work and why my FBI vehicle is not in the driveway

anymore, and that’s sort of complicated to explain to

grammar school children . . . [m]y wife lost her career

shortly after my suspension, and she had to sign a

nondisclosure about that, but it was under very suspicious

circumstances, and I firmly believe that is related to my

situation . . . [s]o neither one of us are gainfully employed,

and that’s been a financial burden on us as well as just a

stressor, because we lost our health insurance, as well, with

her employment termination.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 122.

131

Friend Interview at 105.

Q. And if you had to put an estimate on it, how much has this

ordeal cost you both in time and financially?

A. Well, I would say, it’s difficult to calculate because she

received a severance from her prior employer. But myself,

you know, being out of work for about 20 weeks, 13 of

which unpaid—you’d have to go back and calculate what

my, you know, salary would’ve been for that time period.

But I don’t think you can put a price tag on the stress that it’s

put on our family. I voiced to my supervisors that working

for the FBI was my dream job and that’s all I ever wanted to

do. So having that opportunity taken away from me earlier

than I was expecting has been very disappointing. And the

way that the Bureau has conducted itself against me in the

aftermath—as opposed to actually considering and

investigating the righteousness of my complaint, they’ve

chosen to circle the wagons and go after me—I think is very

disappointing and soured me greatly enough that I actually

resigned today.

132

In addition to his family’s struggles, and to ensure maximum pressure—and, no doubt, to deter

other potential whistleblowers—the FBI denied Friend’s requests for outside employment and

failed to provide him with records to obtain relevant employment. This ultimately led Friend to

have no other option but to resign from his employment with the agency.

B. Garret O’Boyle Was Suspended Without Pay After Moving His Young Family

Across the Country.

Like Friend, O’Boyle was subject to FBI retaliation for making protected disclosures to

Congress after expressing his concerns up his chain of command with no action being taken.

133

O’Boyle, too, had his security clearance suspended.

134

In his interview, he testified that the FBI

has “weaponized that clearance process.”

135

He explained:

They know that if they claim national security that they, carte

blanche, can do whatever they want. And you have to have a security

clearance to work in the FBI. So if they find any reason to strip you

of that clearance, they’ll do it, and they’ll send you packing, and

then there’s no – hardly any recourse for you to take because the FBI

investigates itself.

136

132

Id. at 33-34.

133

O’Boyle Interview at 26-31.

134

Id. at 13.

135

Id. at 14.

136

Id. at 15.

In his transcribed interview, O’Boyle shared his firsthand experience with the

weaponization of the security clearance process. He described how the FBI suspended him right

in the middle of his transfer and two weeks before his wife gave birth to their fourth child,

causing their personal belongings—clothes, toys, furniture—to be stuck in an FBI-controlled

storage unit for an extended period of time. O’Boyle testified:

A. You know, we’re begging and borrowing from family for

coats for our kids and warm clothes for our baby because the

FBI won’t let us have our stuff.

Q. And so I just want to make sure that we have everything,

kind of, the facts straight on this. So you’re notified in June

that you make the new unit and you’re going to be

transferred from Kansas to Virginia, correct?

A. Correct.

137

***

Q. So then in order to retrieve your goods after a month of them

being held by the FBI, you had to spend over $10,000 of your

own money, correct, to retrieve those?

A. I would have to do the math, but it’s right around ten grand.

Q. And in your opinion, do you believe this whole ordeal with

recovering your personal goods and having to cover those

costs, was that just another episode of retaliation?

A. I believe it was. I think every step of the way it just—the

whole process continues to get weaponized. And people are

complicit in it because they claim, well, I’m just doing my

job and I was told to tell you that I can’t let you come get

your stuff, or whatever other excuse they can come up with

to justify it in their own minds.

138

O’Boyle further testified:

Q. And let’s talk a bit more about your transfer from Kansas to

Virginia. You said that you accepted the position in June

and then moved. Your first day was September 26th, I think

you said. Is that correct?

A. Correct.

137

Id. at 20.

138

Id. at 21-23.

Q. So during that time, you sold your house in Kansas, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And then were your personal belongings moved or shipped

to Virginia at some point?

A. They were. So after we closed on our house in—or I guess

right before we closed on our house in Kansas, we had a

contract—I mean, they contract through the government to

some degree, came to our house, they packed up our stuff,

put it in a truck and brought it to Virginia, where it was put

in storage. And we were supposed to get that—those

belongings delivered to the new house once we closed on it.

So I’m trying to think of my dates here. So September 26th

I get suspended. So between September 26th and November

3rd we’re trying to figure out how we can get our stuff. And

for the vast majority of that time, we essentially got the

runaround from the FBI and the business they contract with

on how to release our goods, on if we can get them shipped

or not. And I think I have most of that in email. But

essentially we kept being told, oh, they’re not going to

release your goods, they’re not releasing your goods, we

can’t give you your stuff. And then eventually it was certain

criteria for me to come get it myself. And so typically all of

this is paid for, it’s part of the transfer, and you pay, like, the

tax bill on this stuff. But instead, in my case, they said, you

can come and get it, you have to inspect all of your stuff at

the warehouse that it’s being stored, and then sign off on the

paperwork, and see ya. So at my own expense, again, I rented

moving trucks. A friend of mine came with me from

Wisconsin. Honestly, I couldn’t have done it without him.

He has worked in the moving industry for many years. And

without his expertise, I don’t think my brother and I, who

also — he flew in to help — would’ve been able to even pack

it up correctly, because they essentially just pull it all out and

say, here’s your stuff, make sure it’s all there. So we spent

the whole day doing that. And, yeah, it cost about $10,000

out of my own expenses to handle that. That doesn’t even

account for the labor costs that would’ve been associated

with it. And then it’s interesting that on that same day is

when I was told that my pay was suspended . . . .

139

***

139

Id. at 18-21.

Q. And so for over a month you weren’t able to access your

personal goods. And can you describe what that includes

furniture wise, what?

A. Everything. I mean, it was, yeah, other than, you know, I

think our daughters all had, like, a backpack with, like, a toy

and some clothes. And then my wife and I, same, had, like,

a backpack of clothes and stuff like that. And we obviously

did not anticipate this happening, so when our stuff got

packed up in August, we had summer clothes because we

thought, oh, by late September, early October, we’ll be here,

which the climate is much more moderate than in Wisconsin.

So in October in Wisconsin it’s practically winter and

we’re—just give me a minute.

Q. Take your time.

140

***

Q. And so to accommodate this transfer, you put your Kansas

City home on the market and sell it, correct?

A. Our Wichita home.

Q. Your Wichita home.

A. Well, we lived in a suburb called Derby—

Q. And during that time, did you look for housing in Virginia?

A. We did. And that’s another interesting aspect of it.

So as part of the transfer, you’re supposed to get a house

hunting trip, 10 days. I didn’t know at the time, but I found

out later, that once you accept orders essentially your job is

to focus on that transfer and work on that transfer. Instead, I

was directed by my boss to try to finish up some casework

that I had. So I didn’t even really get to focus on that transfer

like I should have. But I was able to come back to Virginia.

I was here, I think, for 9 days or so, for training for that new

position. So every night after—or just about every night

after training was over, I would meet with my realtor, and

we’d go look at houses. I think in those evenings over that

time span, I think I looked at around 30 or 35 houses. So

even though I didn’t get the 10 day house hunting trip or

140

Id. at 20.

anything like that, I was able to look for housing while I was

at that training, which was in August.

Q. So then did you put an offer on in a house here?

A. We did. My last day of that training, which I think was like

either the last day of August or the first day of September, is

the last house I looked at, and I was like, oh, this is the one.

And once I got back to Kansas, I talked to my wife about it,

showed her pictures and stuff. And we put an offer in on it

which was accepted and—yeah, so we were, like, okay, that

part’s done, now let’s have this baby and then carry on. But

obviously that—it didn’t work out as planned.

Q. And so you packed up all your belongings in August, and

then the FBI moved those belongings to Virginia, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. So you’re now in Virginia, your Kansas City—or your

Wichita house is sold, and your belongings are in Virginia,

and then on the first day at your new job in Virginia, you’re

walked out, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. So then you have to wait over a month to retrieve your

belongings because, as you’ve said, the FBI was giving you

the runaround, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Did you have access to those belongings during that period

of time?

A. I did not.

Q. And did you ask the FBI for access to those belongings?

A. We did. We asked if we could come get them and because

there was really no other way than—that’s when it was just

back and forth, back and forth, or then not hearing from

them, and then them saying, oh, we’re trying to figure out

the best way to get you your stuff. And then at one point,

were, like, well, can you ship them here? Because we’re not

living in Virginia now. And then I think at one point they

were, like, oh, we might be able to do that, but it’s going to

cost you $17,000. And we were, like, whoa, no, we—I’m

suspended. Like, we knew my pay was going to get

suspended. It hadn’t been suspended yet. But we were, like,

no, we’re not paying you $17,000 for you to send us our stuff

that you took to Virginia. So then we were able—they

eventually they agreed to let me go and get it. That still cost,

like I said, about ten grand, but I guess that beats 17.

Q. And the FBI wouldn’t—in the normal course of things, if

you’re transferred, the FBI pays for those expenses, and

then, as you said, you’re in charge of the tax bill. Is that

correct?

A. Correct.

141

“Nearly 180 days” after his suspension, O’Boyle testified that he had not heard from the FBI

regarding the status of his security clearance.

142

Ms. Moore, who signed O’Boyle’s notice that

his security clearance was suspended, testified that O’Boyle’s situation was a mere

“coincidence.”

143

Ms. Moore specifically stated:

Q. The date that’s on Mr. O’Boyle’s letter? That

was . . . October 22

[?]

A. Yeah. And what day did Mr. O’Boyle execute his actual

move?

Q. His first day was on September 23, 2022.

A. And so what was the date of the letter?

Q. September 23, 2022.

A. Okay.

Q. So that’s just some big coincidence, that it was his first day

[in Virginia]?

A. Absolutely.

144

141

Id. at 21-23.

142

Id.

143

Moore Interview at 121-23.

144

Id. at 121.

Pointedly, however, O’Boyle believes that the agency was intentionally weaponized

against him.

145

As O’Boyle testified:

Q. Culture wise, is the current FBI the same FBI you signed

up to work for?

A. Not at all.

Q. Why?

A. I think the biggest reason is how they have become

weaponized against anyone who doesn’t just toe the line that

they want them to toe. I think I’m a primary example of that.

I start shedding light on things, on wrongdoing that is

happening in the FBI; I get suspended. And I know I’m not

alone. There are a number of other whistleblowers out there

who are in a similar situation after being suspended. Some

of them, after—it said—they claim they don’t retaliate for

First Amendment protected activity. I know for a fact that

they do, because one of my protected disclosures was about

that, about the FBI retaliating against employees for

engaging in First Amendment protected activity, and those

employees got suspended.

146

Many other FBI whistleblowers told O’Boyle that they believe his experience is perhaps

the most severe exhibition of the FBI’s weaponization.

147

As O’Boyle told the Committee and

Select Subcommittee:

Q. The retaliation that you’ve testified to today seems to have

an enhanced feature of cruelty to it.

A. I agree. I agree.

Q. You know, are you and the other whistleblowers, the cases

that you’re aware of, are there features of such acute cruelty?

A. Not like this. My situation is one that all the other

whistleblowers I’ve talked to are like, “I just can’t believe”

— I mean, and they’re in a similar situation, they’re

suspended without pay, and they say, “I can’t believe what

has happened to you.” You know, earlier, I alluded I went to

Iraq and Afghanistan, a year each, as an infantryman. I

received the Combat Infantryman Badge for—I mean, that

145

O’Boyle Interview at 37-38.

146

Id.

147

Id. at 108-09.

is awarded to infantrymen who fight the enemy. So I’ve been

shot at. I’ve had rockets shot at me, IEDs. And it’s different,

but this, what I’m going through right now, is harder than

those deployments. When I got home from Afghanistan, I

knew I was getting out of the Army. I had 10, 11 months left.

And I was like—I had just turned 25, and I was like, “I’m

done. The hardest thing I will do in my life, I’ve done it, and

now I can move on.” And then this happened. And it’s not

war, but it’s very war like, in what it has done to me

mentally, what it’s doing to me and my family. And I didn’t

have a family then. You know, I just had my wife. And, you

know, yeah, it’s just—it’s hard to believe.

Q. Yeah . . . In these other suspensions, there doesn’t seem to

be this purposeful manifestation of cruelty to someone’s

family, to someone’s living situation, to someone’s ability to

secure future employment. Why do you think the acuity of

the cruelty is so much higher with you?

A. I wish I knew. I think it probably just goes back to the

pervasiveness of how the FBI has deemed—they’ve decided

they’re going to do what they want, on their agenda, on their

terms, that they’re the law, and they’re not going to have

someone internally shining a light in the darkness on the bad

things that they are doing. And I think they realized, we have

him in the perfect position to completely flip his life upside

down and cause torment to him. Because then they can come

back and say, well, look at his mental status, or, you know,

he’s clearly unstable, he hasn’t had a job, or whatever they

might try to drum up in the future, which I wouldn’t be

surprised at anything they try to drum up. But—

Q. Do you believe they’re making an example out of you?

A. I do, yeah. I think it’s clear. I mean, and I think that also has

a cooling effect on speech, because any FBI employee who

hears my story I’m sure would be stunned.

Q. So you believe that you and your family are

being . . . tortured so that the FBI can send a message to any

future whistleblowers that this is what life will be like for

you?

A. I do.

148

Id.

C. Marcus Allen Was Suspended for Merely Forwarding Open-Source News Articles

to His Colleagues.

The FBI retaliated against Marcus Allen, a decorated Marine and former FBI Staff

Operations Specialist in the Charlotte Field Office, for simply performing the duties of his job.

149

Like other whistleblowers, Allen was suspended without pay.

Allen, who held a top-secret security clearance for approximately two decades, had

worked as part of FBI Charlotte’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) while employed by the

Bureau.

150

In addition to the JTTF, Allen’s duties included “respond[ing] to the intelligence

program.”

151

In order to meet the requirements of the intelligence program, Allen testified he

was required to perform “all-source analysis” in which he would “research publicly available

information [and] anything on the open web . . . to help out with our assessments and cases that

the FBI has.”

152

While reading open-source news articles and watching open-source opinion

videos concerning the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, Allen testified that he sent

around links to these articles for his squad’s “situational awareness” related to the FBI’s

investigation.

153

Because these open-source articles questioned the FBI’s handling of the

violence at the Capitol, the FBI suspended Allen for “conspiratorial views in regards to the

events of January 6th . . . .”

154

However, Allen testified that passing along such articles was “part

of [his] job.”

155

Allen particularly stated:

Q. And why exactly did you send th[e] email[s]?

A. I sent [the emails] just for awareness because

the[y] . . . indicated potential problems with the

investigation as far as informants were concerned, and our

organization’s potential forthrightness about the utilization

of informants there on that day. That might have some

impact on our cases and the subjects that we’re looking up,

and just a general awareness overall for the investigation as

a whole, that there might have been some kind of potential

Federal involvement with the activities on January 6th, and

I thought it was important enough that it like warranted our

attention, you know.

Q. Is it safe to say that you sending th[ose] email[s] was part of

your job at the time?

A. Yes.

149

Allen Interview at 49.

150

Id. at 10.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 25.

154

Id. at 19.

155

Id. at 30.

Q. Did you direct any of your colleagues to take any action

regarding [these emails]?

A No.

156

Worse yet, the FBI did not even give Allen the opportunity to rebut the allegations or to

meet with agency leadership in his office.

157

Instead, Allen testified:

Q. So I want to talk more about the actual day of your

suspension. I know that might be tough. So can you walk us

through what happened that day?

A. Yes. So on the actual day of my suspension, I met with the

chief security officer . . . , as well as [the] assistant special

agent in charge . . . . The assistant special agents in charge

are like the top three or four agents in the office right

underneath the special agent in charge who’s the chief

essentially. And I met with them in a parking lot at a Cracker

Barrel off of Carowinds Boulevard in Charlotte. They met

me, and they read off a letter in the parking lot that I was

being suspended for conspiratorial views in regards to the

events of January 6th, and that my suspension—the date of

the start was January 10th. The day of the meeting was

January 19th, and it would be without pay as well.

158

However, the retaliation did not end with Allen’s suspension. During his suspension,

Allen testified that he sought the FBI’s permission to seek outside employment, but the FBI has

refused to acknowledge his requests or provide him with the documentation necessary for other

employment. Allen specifically testified:

Q. Have you ever sought [the FBI’s] approval for outside

employment?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you expand upon that and tell us when you sought

outside employment?

A. Yes. I sought outside employment within the past month. I

went through the process. Because of the nature of the

employer, I needed to correspond with an ethics attorney,

which I did. I explained to him the announcement and the

type of job, and we had a correspondence back and forth.

156

Id. at 30-31.

157

Id.

158

Id.

And he relayed to me to go ahead and submit the outside

employment form, the 331B, to the chief security officer at

the Charlotte Field Office, . . . , which I did. I reached out to

her. I submitted it, and she said she put it within the

[Enterprise Process Automation System].

159

That

employment approval—there’s a 15 business day response

time, and that 15 day response time has been expired for

several days, and I’ve received no correspondence back from

the Bureau in its regard.

160

Allen additionally testified:

Q. And so you have received no answer as of today about your

outside employment request?

A. No.

Q. And before that, did you submit to the FBI a prayer journal

for prepublication review?

A. Yes.

Q. And when, about, was that?

A. Let’s see. That would’ve been October of 2022.

Q. And why did you submit it to the FBI for prepublication

review?

A. I just wanted to make sure that it was okay; that, you know,

I had their okay to go ahead and do it. Because of the nature

of the situation, I conveyed, you know, there is nothing in

here referencing my time as an employee for the FBI. You

know, there’s nothing in reference to the FBI like, basically

conveying to them that there’s nothing there that I’m trying

to profit off of my association with the FBI. And I just want

to make sure that I’ve got the, “Hey, we’re good to go. You

can go ahead and do whatever you want with your prayer

journal.” There was a correspondence back and forth, and

then the correspondence dropped off, and I got no response

after that.

159

Privacy Impact Assessment for the Enterprise Process Automation System (EPAS), FED. BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION (July 15, 2011), https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/more-fbi-services-and-

information/freedom-of-information-privacy-act/department-of-justice-fbi-privacy-impact-assessments/enterprise-

process-automation-system.

160

Allen Interview at 66-67.

Q. So your goal was to publish the prayer journal. Is that

correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And maybe gain some income, since you weren’t earning

any income at that point in time?

A. Yes.

Q. So you’re suspended from the FBI February of 2022. Is that

correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you get a month of pay due to your service to the

country. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you are without pay from February until today,

correct?

A. Correct.

Q. So you sought prepublication of your prayer journal in

October of 2022 to earn some income, and then you never

heard back from the FBI as to whether or not you could go

ahead and publish it?

A. Correct.

Q. And then, just this month, you requested outside

employment approval. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have never heard back from the FBI?

A. No.

Q. So you’ve been languishing now for over a year on unpaid

suspension. Is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And, during that time, you have earned no income. Is that

correct?

A. Correct.

161

Allen further testified about the financial hardship that the FBI’s decision to suspend him without

pay has had on his family. He explained:

My family and I have been surviving on early withdrawals from our

retirement accounts while the FBI has ignored my request for

approval to obtain outside employment during the review of my

security clearance.

162

The FBI officially revoked Mr. Allen’s security clearance one day after his transcribed

interview to this Committee.

D. Whistleblowers Have Described How the FBI’s Politicization Has Crowded Out its

Traditional Law Enforcement Function.

Whistleblowers have told the Committee that the FBI’s Washington hierarchy is “rotted

at its core” and maintains a “systemic culture of unaccountability.” The FBI and the Department

of Justice have been deeply politicized by its current partisan leadership. This politicized

behavior has adversely affected front-line FBI agents.

According to O’Boyle, the FBI has allowed itself to be “enveloped in this politicization

and weaponization” so much so that it is “a cancerous point.”

163

O’Boyle testified:

Q. Are you aware of allegations that the FBI is using security

clearance revocations as a tool to purge conservatives from

its ranks?

A. I am.

Q. Do you believe that’s occurring?

A. I do.

Q. Do you believe that the FBI has become political?

A. I do.

Q. Do you think the extent of the politicization at the FBI is a

161

Id. at 68-70.

162

Id. at 6.

163

O’Boyle Interview at 154.

problem that festers within its hierarchy, or is it nationwide,

enterprise-wide?

A. I think it’s encompassed in the hierarchy and then it trickles

down throughout the rest of the Bureau. And those who are

especially geared towards promoting will adhere themselves

to whatever they need to promote. I think most people out in

the field try to avoid that politicization of the agency, which

is good. But it’s gotten to a point, it seems to me, that it’s

like a cancerous point where the FBI has let itself become

enveloped in this politicization and weaponization that I

don’t know how to even begin to fix it.

164

When asked about characterizations of the FBI’s hierarchy, Friend stated that it was

“consistent” with what he has heard from other FBI employees.

165

Friend testified:

Q. Whistleblowers told committee Republicans that the FBI’s

Washington hierarchy is, quote, “rotted at its core,” end

quote, maintains a, quote, “systemic culture of

unaccountability,” end quote, and is full of, quote, “rampant

corruption, manipulation, and abuse,” end quote. Do you

agree with these statements?

A. Yes.

Q. And what is your reaction to hearing that this is how people

characterize the FBI?

A. It sounds consistent with just about everybody that I’ve

talked to who has never gone to headquarters.

Q. So it doesn’t surprise you that fellow FBI employees and

agents are making these characterizations?

A. No.

166

Similarly, Allen testified about the politicization that he has witnessed within the FBI. He

explained:

Q. Mr. Allen, do you feel that you’ve been treated fairly?

A. No.

164

Id.

165

Friend Interview at 130-31.

166

Id.

Q. Do you believe that the FBI has become political?

A. Yes.

Q. Given your experience, do you see any other recent actions

that we haven’t discussed today by the Biden administration,

DOJ, and the FBI as problematic?

A. Problematic? I would say, by appearance, some of the

information that’s been made available in the public domain

about public corruption that on the surface appears to not be

being pursued seems problematic, especially in regards of

public corruption when it comes from the highest offices in

the land.

Q. Is it fair to say that you’ve lost confidence in the FBI’s

leadership?

A. Yes.

Q. So the FBI told this committee that it . . . ”does not target or

take adverse actions against employees for exercising First

Amendment rights or for their political views.” Do you think

that’s accurate?

A. I don’t agree with that statement.

167

In Hill’s view, similarly, the FBI needs “tough love” to eliminate its highly politicized culture

and return to a “highly functioning, apolitical, high-performing FBI.”

168

For whistleblowers who have spoken with the Committee and the Select Subcommittee,

working for the FBI was their dream job.

169

They came to Congress with the goal of helping to

return the FBI to its origins as an effective, apolitical law enforcement agency.

170

The FBI’s

motto—Fidelity, Bravery, Integrity—has long been used to describe the motivation of the men

and women who serve.

171

Yet agents like O’Boyle and Friend do not believe the FBI has kept

167

Id.

168

Hill Interview at 103.

169

See Friend Interview at 34; see also O’Boyle Interview at 8, 25.

170

See, e.g., O’Boyle Interview at 26 (“[W]hen we see things that are wrong, that are harmful to people, that are

unloving, or that are against the law, it’s my duty to speak up.”); see also id. at 25 (“Every single American deserves

the rights that are provided to us in the Constitution. And every single FBI agent should uphold those rights. And

every single FBI agent, when they see that the agency they work for are treading over those rights, they have to

speak up.”); see also id. at 30 (“I think in a lot of ways I was, like, oh, the FBI’s not actually what I thought it was,

where you have people who want to serve this great nation and keep it strong and uphold the Constitution. Rather,

you have people who just do what they’re told and want to climb that ladder and get that pension.”).

171

See Seal & Motto, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/seal-motto (last visited May 17, 2023).

faith with this motto, stating it “couldn’t be further from the truth.”

172

And when they spoke out

against what they reasonably believed were abuses and violations of law, they were silenced and

their lives were upended. The efforts to silence whistleblowers, treat them cruelly, and ruin their

careers are intended to prevent other agents from speaking out. The first step toward treatment is

diagnosing the illness, and these brave whistleblowers have outlined the systemic sickness at the

FBI’s core.

172

O’Boyle Interview at 90; see also id. (stating that other agents have supported his whistleblowing but “when they

see something that’s wrong, most of them don’t report it, because they’re trying to get to that 20-year mark and get

that pension or whatever … is inhibiting them”).

III. Committee Democrats Attacked and Defamed FBI Whistleblowers to Advance a

Political Agenda.

On March 2, 2023, Committee Democrats released a misleading document based on

selective, cherry-picked information to attack some of the FBI whistleblowers who bravely

testified to the Committee and Select Subcommittee.

173

Rather than engage in good faith with the

substance of the concerns raised by these FBI whistleblowers, the Democrats mischaracterized

much of the whistleblowers’ testimony, reached conclusions not based in fact or law, and

denigrated these Americans with ad hominem attacks. The Democrat’s report was so egregiously

inaccurate that news organizations reporting on it were forced to later correct the record about

the whistleblowers.

174

Wildly, the Democrat report asserted that “[n]o law protects witnesses who speak to

Congress.”

175

This assertion is plain wrong. But worse, it reveals the Democrats’ broader posture

toward these brave federal law-enforcement officers: distort, distract, and discredit any effort to

expose federal bureaucratic misconduct. The Democrats similarly deployed this strategy during

the Select Subcommittee’s March 9, 2023, hearing to expose the government-censorship

complex. During that hearing, several Democrat Members pressured two independent and highly

respected journalists to reveal their sources, and Ranking Member Stacey Plaskett attacked them

as “so-called journalists.”

176

A. The Democrat Report Erroneously Claims that the FBI Whistleblowers Who

Have Appeared Before the Committee Are Not Real Whistleblowers.

During their transcribed interviews, each of the FBI whistleblowers detailed episodes in

which they had firsthand knowledge of what they reasonably believed to constitute fraud, waste,

abuse, mismanagement, or violations of a law, rule, or regulation at the FBI. Despite the

unsupported conclusions in the Democrats’ report asserting otherwise, these episodes as detailed

by the whistleblowers in their own words are exactly the types of protected disclosures

contemplated by whistleblower protection laws.

Federal law—specifically, 5 U.S.C. § 2303—protects federal employees, including FBI

employees, from retaliation for disclosing what he or she reasonably believes to be evidence of a

violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of

authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.

177

Under the law, a

whistleblower is protected even if what he or she discloses ends up being wrong or mistaken, so

173

Democratic Staff of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong., GOP Witnesses: What Their Disclosures Indicate

About the State of the Republican Investigations 1 (hereinafter “Democrat Report”).

174

See, e.g., Luke Broadwater and Adam Goldman, G.O.P. Witnesses, Paid by Trump Ally, Embrace Jan. 6

Conspiracy Theories, N.Y.

TIMES (Mar. 2, 2023); Justine McDaniel, Democrats Challenge Credibility of GOP

Witnesses Who Embrace False Jan. 6 Claims, W

ASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2023).

175

See Democrat Report, supra note 173, at 10.

176

The Twitter Files Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on the Weaponization of the Fed. Gov’t, 118th Cong. 8

(2023) (statement of Rep. Stacey Plaskett, Delegate, United States Virgin Islands).

177

5 U.S.C. § 2303 (emphasis added).

long as it is a reasonable, good-faith belief.

178

The law is not overly complicated, yet the

Democrats’ report claims without evidence that “[n]one of the three witnesses interviewed to

date comes close to meeting that definition” of a whistleblower.

179

Democrats concede, as they

must, that an FBI employee is protected from reprisal if a whistleblower makes a disclosure that

he or she reasonably believes to evidence such violations.

180

Nevertheless, throughout their

report, they ignored the reasonable belief standard and, instead, invented a beyond a reasonable

doubt standard that whistleblowers must satisfy.

181

The Democrats’ report improperly tries to disqualify the whistleblowers’ numerous

meritorious claims by mischaracterizing their disclosures, manipulating their testimony, and

making false claims to support the Democrats’ conclusion that Hill, O’Boyle, and Friend are not

real whistleblowers. Despite the Democrat’s bluster, the record is crystal clear. Each of these

whistleblowers had a good-faith basis for believing wrongdoing had occurred.

1. George Hill.

Retired FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst George Hill provided the Committee with

detailed allegations of FBI abuses. However, instead of engaging with Hill’s allegations, the

Democrat report minimized the allegations by trying to discredit Hill. The report claims that

“Hill explained that he himself did not handle any cases . . . and, while he viewed an electronic

communication referencing the list in the FBI’s case management system, he never opened or

viewed the actual list himself.”

182

Rolling Stone, in an article based on information leaked from

Democrats, assumed this biased framing, asserting that Hill “learned about [the allegations] only

through secondhand chatter from colleagues.”

183

In a response to Rolling Stone, Hill’s attorney

explained that this assertion was “factually incorrect, misleading, and lacked context.”

184

examination of Hill’s testimony demonstrates that the Rolling Stone article—and the Democrat

assertion on which it is based—is wrong.

Hill testified that he observed the FBI Sentinel electronic message bringing the list of

Bank of America customers’ transactions purportedly related to January 6th into the FBI’s

internal system, and that “the [Supervisory Special Agent] and I had already talked about it, and

the SSA had already talked to the [Assistant Special Agent in Charge] about it.”

185

Hill believed

the FBI’s receipt of this information was a violation of law, explaining that “there was no legal

178

See id.; see also Whistleblower Rights and Protections, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General,

https://oig.justice.gov/hotline/whistleblower-protection (last visited May 17, 2023) (explaining the requirements for

a disclosure to be protected).

179

See Democrat Report, supra note 173, at 4 (internal quotations omitted).

180

Id.

181

See id. at 29 (claiming O’Boyle “did not present any violation of a law, rule, or regulation, or of gross

mismanagement, waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial danger to public health or safety”); see also

id. at 49-50 (claiming Friend also did not provide any evidence).

182

Democrat Report, supra note 173, at 11.

183

Kara Voght, Adam Rawnsley, Asawin Suebaeng, Inside Jim Jordan’s Disastrous Search for a ‘Deep State’

Whistleblower, R

OLLING STONE (March 2, 2023).

184

See Jason Foster (@JsnFostr), Twitter (Mar. 3, 2023, 9:45 AM),

https://twitter.com/JsnFostr/status/1631667084512903170.

185

Hill Interview at 74.

process . . . asking for it . . . from the Bureau or from DOJ or anybody.”

186

On these facts, it is

clear that Hill had a reasonable belief that there was a violation of law.

2. Garret O’Boyle.

The Democrat’s attempt to discredit the disclosures of O’Boyle by creating a procedural

strawman around his allegations. They criticized O’Boyle for not providing information in his

transcribed interview that was included in his protected disclosures to Congress. The Democrats

concede “[t]hat material may well include relevant, probative evidence that would bear on the

validity of his claims,” but still wrongly assert that O’Boyle provided no “evidence of a violation

of law, rule, or regulation . . . .”

187

Here too, the Democrats ignored the substance of O’Boyle’s

testimony.

During his transcribed interview, O’Boyle highlighted his numerous firsthand

experiences with fraud, waste, and abuse at the FBI.

• In highlighting the FBI’s attempt to inflate DVE numbers, he testified to one instance in

which the FBI instructed him to divide one case into four cases, to “open a case for every

individual that I had an articulable, factual basis that there may have been potential

Federal law being violated.”

188

He said this was done so the FBI could show Congress

that DVE cases were on the rise and in turn receive more funding.

189

• In another part of his interview, O’Boyle testified about the EDUOFFICIALS threat tag,

used by the FBI to investigate parents who attended school board meetings. O’Boyle

testified that investigating parents for First Amendment-protected free speech was

“absolutely not” a proper use of FBI resources.

190

• He also testified to the FBI’s use of “arbitrary” metrics to award bonuses to Special

Agents in Charge.

191

By basing bonuses on arbitrary metrics like how many Title III

wiretaps or FISAs were obtained, O’Boyle stated that this focus on metrics “leads to a

pervasive culture of not letting the cases dictate where the investigation goes, but it’s the

manager or the agent pushing for a certain avenue.”

192

This testimony establishes that O’Boyle had a reasonable belief that the FBI was violating the

law, abusing its authority, or wasting taxpayer funding.

3. Stephen Friend.

The Democrat report also presents a strawman to discount FBI whistleblower Friend’s

allegations of FBI abuse. The report asserts that because the Office of Special Counsel (OSC)

186

Id. at 76.

187

Democrat Report, supra note 173, at 29.

188

O’Boyle Interview at 92.

189

Id. at 92-93.

190

Id. at 85.

191

Id. at 98-100.

192

Id. at 99.

and the Department of Justice’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) declined to open an

investigation into Friend’s claims, his whistleblower claims are invalid.

193

Neither the facts nor

the law support the Democrats’ anti-whistleblower assertions.

While OSC and OIG did not open investigations into Friend’s whistleblower claims, OIG

did not reject Friend’s retaliation claim.

194

In response to erroneous media reporting relying on

the Democrats’ report in early March 2023, Friend’s attorney explained that “the OIG ’had not

investigated Friend’s claims at that point, but did not reject them either—it simply claimed it did

not have enough resources and chose not to open an investigation.

195

The OIG asked Friend for

his permission to refer the disclosure back to the FBI to investigate itself, which Friend declined

to provide.”

196

By obsessing on OSC’s failure to open an investigation, Democrats ignored serious allegations

of FBI wrongdoing. Specifically, Friend’s written complaint, which he provided to the

Democrats in advance of his transcribed interview, included allegations that the FBI engaged in

at least three systemic abuses.

197

Friend testified about matters concerning:

• The manipulation of case management policies to drive a false narrative supporting an FBI

priority;

198

• The violation of the DOJ’s Use of Force policy and FBI policy to send a message to

disfavored actors; and

199

• Whistleblower retaliation.

200

During his transcribed interview, Friend testified about how the FBI’s focus on January 6

cases led to wasted resources and a de-emphasis on child exploitation crimes.

201

Friend related

one example in which the FBI ordered Friend to make a three-hour round-trip to conduct an in-

person interview of a January 6 subject, even though other less-intrusive methods had not

substantiated the allegations.

202

Friend explained that he learned the subject was not in D.C. on

January 6 because he was at his son’s funeral in Florida.

203

Friend testified that by confronting

the man about his whereabouts on that day, he needlessly forced the man to re-live the worst day

of his life.

204

As Friend’s attorney explained to the media, “Friend’s disclosures are protected

193

Democrat Report, supra note 173, at 30-31.

194

Friend Interview at 92-96.

195

See Letter from Tristan Leavitt, President, Empower Oversight, to Hon. Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen.,

U.S. Dep’t of Investigation; See also Letter from Jason Foster, Founder & President, Empower Oversight, to U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, Office of Inspector Gen. (Jan. 31, 2023).

196

Letter from Jason Foster, Founder & President, Empower Oversight, to U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Inspector

Gen. (Jan. 31, 2023).

197

See Democrat Report, supra note 173, at 175.

198

Id. at 131.

199

Id. at 19-20, 26.

200

Friend Interview at 21, 23, 32-33.

201

Id. at 8.

202

Id. at 192.

203

Id.

204

Id.

whistleblower disclosure about wasted resources

205

—and Friend testified accordingly

206

—but

the Democrats edited that portion of the transcript out of their one-sided presentation.”

207

B. The Democrat Report Slandered the Integrity of Veteran Federal Law

Enforcement Officers in the Service of Partisan Politics.

Committee Democrats ignored the substance of O’Boyle’s, Friend’s, and Hill’s

allegations of FBI wrongdoing. Instead, they attacked the messengers with ad hominem attacks.

Throughout their report, Democrats implied and then explicitly accused these former FBI

employees of being “insurrectionists” and “conspiracy theorists” who only sought to profit from

their whistleblowing activities.

In their report, Democrats asserted that these FBI whistleblowers objected to the arrest of

January 6 subjects who had committed crimes. This is wrong and easily contradicted by the

actual whistleblower testimony. For example:

• In questioning from Democrat staff, Friend explicitly condemned the individuals who

committed violence on January 6th. He testified: “[A] lot of these guys are bad dudes,

and they should go to jail. And we didn’t follow our rules, and we set ourselves up to get

crushed at trial . . . lose on appeal. I want to win.”

208

Friend explained that his concern

was with the process leading to the arrests, not with the people, especially when certain

January 6 subjects were cooperating with investigators.

209

• Hill similarly testified: “I don’t support, under any circumstances, attacking police

officers, breaking into restricted areas, destroying of government property. . . . Every

person that broke the law needs to be identified and prosecuted to the fullest extent. What

I take umbrage with is casting in a sea net covering miles and scooping up everything that

they can and the erosion of civil liberties surrounding that.”

210

• When asked whether he believes the government should be prosecuting individuals that

were involved on January 6th, O’Boyle testified: “Some of them, yes.”

211

Rather than address the content of the whistleblower allegations, Democrats attacked the

whistleblowers for their personal, constitutionally protected views. At each transcribed

interview, Democrats spent a majority of their time badgering the witnesses about their personal

opinions on public matters. Democrats confronted the witnesses with cherry-picked social media

posts, hoping to portray the whistleblowers as holding controversial, disfavored, or unpopular

205

Katelynn Richardson, DOJ Internal Watchdog Shuts Down House Democrats’ Claims Against FBI

Whistleblower Steve Friend, D

AILY CALLER (Mar. 16, 2023), https://dailycaller.com/2023/03/16/doj-inspector-

general-office-whisteblower-corrects-democrat-claims/ (last accessed May 16, 2023).

206

Friend Interview at 30, 135.

207

See generally Democrat Report, supra note 173.

208

Friend Interview at 173.

209

Id. at 19, 173.

210

Hill Interview at 125.

211

O’Boyle Interview at 65.

personal opinions.

212

The Democrats used this information in their report to complain that each

whistleblower “offered a wide range of personal opinions,” and suggest that the substance of

their whistleblower disclosure was therefore discredited.

213

Democrats even pried into the private finances of the whistleblowers, hoping to malign

them as having pecuniary motivations for disclosing FBI wrongdoing. The Democrats criticized

Friend for receiving help from a former Trump Administration official in finding a job after the

FBI all but forced him to resign.

214

Because Friend’s new employer supports the important work

of the Select Subcommittee,

215

the Democrat report concluded that “[p]ublicity generated by the

Committee’s investigation would benefit Friend in his new role by increasing the visibility of

that organization” and, therefore, “Friend has a monetary incentive to continue pursuing his

claims.”

216

Moreover, the Democrat report baselessly chastised Friend for accepting a monetary gift

from a friendly organization during his FBI suspension. The Democrats implied that this gift

colored the reliability of Friend’s testimony,

217

but they conveniently omitted that the FBI had

denied Friend’s request to seek outside employment, leaving him to exhaust his accrued leave

time, expend his personal savings, and eventually go without pay.

218

The Democrat report also

failed to mention that Friend’s wife lost her job and, at the time, was recovering from a serious

surgery.

219

When Friend again asked the FBI to seek outside employment and for his training

records—so he could pursue other employment opportunities—he never heard back.

220

In his testimony, Friend denied, clearly and unequivocally, that he was paid to come

forward with his allegations against the FBI.

221

Friend testified that he never took money from a

fundraising account that he promoted for suspended whistleblowers’ living expenses,

222

denied making money from the articles he wrote,

223

and he declared that he has not yet made any

money off of a book he authored about his experience.

224

Only after the FBI denied Friend’s

requests for outside employment and only after Friend and his family survived 150 days of

unpaid suspension did Friend take a job as a fellow with a conservative organization to provide

for his family and “be a productive citizen.”

225

Like Friend, O’Boyle experienced Democrat slander during and after his transcribed

interview. The Democrat report insinuates that O’Boyle had a “financial connection” to a former

Trump Administration official and his attorney “appeared to surprise his client with an

212

Id.

213

Id.

214

Democrat Report, supra note 173, at 7.

215

Id. at 76.

216

Id. at 34.

217

Id. at 72.

218

Id. at 32.

219

Democrat Report, supra note 173, at 101.

220

Id. at 32-33.

221

Id. at 73-77, 83.

222

Id. at 76-77.

223

Id. at 82.

224

Democrat Report, supra note 173, at 82-83.

225

Id. at 43.

announcement that he was now representing O’Boyle pro bono.”

226

Conveniently, the Democrat

report omitted that O’Boyle spent over $10,000 to retrieve his personal belongings from FBI

storage after the FBI gave him the “run around” when it suspended him on his first day after a

cross-country transfer.

227

Notably, their attack on Hill’s credibility was so unfair that it prompted an apology from

Democrats at the interview for impugning his credibility.

228

Particularly, during Hill’s testimony

to this Committee and Subcommittee, counsel for Democrats on the Committee and

Subcommittee castigated Hill for some social media posts and podcast appearances in which Hill

disseminated his political opinions based on his concerns that were apparent during his time at

the FBI. After the Democrats’ counsel ceased the attacks, Hill testified:

Q. So, just before we close, the minority staff spent a lot of time

going through various what I would call political opinions

that you have posted since leaving the FBI. Is it fair to say

that those opinions were based on the concerns that you had

about what you saw while you were in the FBI as well as

public reporting?

A. Yes. Nothing’s changed. I love the FBI. But, like with any

parent, I mean—or if someone calls themself your friend, if

they’re not willing to say, “Hey, you need to adjust

yourself,” they’re not your friend. If all they do is just say,

“Hey, this is great, this is great, this is great, keep going the

way you’re going,” they’re truly not your friend and they’re

not a very good parent. Nothing’s changed. I want the FBI

to be successful.

Q. So the minority staff also, in the first round of questioning,

said that your statements on the podcast went to your

claimed that they went to your credibility. I didn’t hear

anything that suggested that you were dishonest in any way,

in any form, anywhere, anytime. Is everything that you

testified to today with regard to the facts accurate and

truthful, to the best of your knowledge?

A. Regarding fact testimony, yes. Opinions are opinions, and,

unfortunately, I probably gave too many of those.

[Minority Counsel]. And I should clarify. I did say “credibility.” I meant to say

“bias.”

A. Huge difference.

226

Id. at 7.

227

O’Boyle Interview at 23.

228

Hill Interview at 147-48.

[Minority Counsel]. And I—yeah, I did not mean to impugn your credibility, and

I do apologize.

A. I—for the record, I—quite frankly, I found it offensive.

[Minority Counsel]. I apologize.

A. I don’t know if you’ve ever been subject to a full scope

lifestyle poly, but it’s—yeah. You went there.

229

C. Democrats Deployed the Same Abusive Tactics to Attempt to Discredit

Journalists Matt Taibbi and Michael Shellenberger.

The Democrat report exemplifies their tactics of personal destruction. These tactics were

on full display during the Select Subcommittee’s March 9, 2023, hearing about government

censorship revealed by two journalists in the Twitter files. There, as they did when they accused

the FBI whistleblowers of not being real whistleblowers, Democrats suggested that the

journalists covering the Twitter Files—Matt Taibbi and Michael Shellenberger—were not real

journalists, but merely “so-called journalists.”

230

During her line of questioning at the hearing, Democrat Representative Debbie

Wasserman Schultz told Taibbi, “Being a Republican witness today certainly cast[s] a cloud over

your objectivity.”

231

This is no different from the attack Democrats lodged against the

whistleblowers, telling the New York Times that by testifying to a Republican-led Committee, the

whistleblowers “have engaged in partisan conduct that calls into question their credibility.”

232

Just as the Democrat report accused Friend and O’Boyle of receiving money from a conservative

organization in order to shape their testimony, Democrat members asked Taibbi if he benefitted

financially from exposing misconduct. During her questioning, Representative Wasserman

Schultz admonished Taibbi:

Before the release of the emails . . . in August of last year, you had

661,000 Twitter followers. After the Twitter Files, your followers

doubled, and now it’s three times what it was last August. I imagine

your Substack [r]eadership, which is a subscription, increased

significantly because of the work you did for Elon Musk. Now, I’m

not asking you to put a dollar figure on it, but it’s quite obvious that

you’ve profited from the Twitter Files. You hit the jackpot on that

Vegas slot machine to which you referred. That’s true, isn’t it?

233

229

Id.

230

The Twitter Files Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. On the Weaponization of the Fed. Gov’t, 118th Cong. 8

(2023) (statement of Del. Stacey Plaskett).

231

Id. at 33 (questioning from Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz).

232

See Broadwater and Goldman, supra note 174.

233

The Twitter Files Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on the Weaponization of the Fed. Gov’t, 118th Cong. 34-

35 (2023) (questioning from Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz).

Taibbi denied the insinuation that his reporting was profit-motivated—calling it “a wash”

between income generated and income spent on his reporting—and defended the integrity of his

work.

234

The startling Democrat attacks on the First Amendment continued when they pressed the

journalists to reveal their sources for the information contained in the Twitter Files. They pressed

Taibbi and Shellenberger:

Ms. Plaskett: And then who gave you access to these emails?

Who was the individual that gave you

permission to access the emails?

Mr. Taibbi: Well, the attribution from my story is sources

at Twitter, and that’s what I’m going to refer to.

Ms. Plaskett: Okay. Did Mr. Musk contact you, Mr. Taibbi?

Mr. Taibbi: Again, the attribution from my story is sources

at Twitter.

Ms. Plaskett: Mr. Shellenberger, did Mr. Musk contact you?

Mr. Shellenberger: Actually, no. I was brought in by my friend,

Bari Weiss.

235

***

Ms. Garcia: Mr. Taibbi, I want to follow up a little bit on

the ranking member’s questions. When was the

first time that Mr. Musk approached you about

writing The Twitter Files?

Mr. Taibbi: Again, Congresswoman, that would –

Ms. Garcia: I just need a date, sir.

Mr. Taibbi: But I can’t give it to you, unfortunately,

because this is a question of sourcing, and I

don’t give up – I’m a journalist. I don’t reveal

my sources.

Ms. Garcia: It’s not a question of sources. It’s a question of

chronology.

234

Id.

235

Id. at 51 (questioning from Del. Stacey Plaskett).

Mr. Taibbi: No. That’s a question of sources.

Ms. Garcia: Because you earlier said that someone had sent

you to the internet, some message about

whether or not you would be interested in some

information.

Mr. Taibbi: Yes. And I refer to that person as a source.

Ms. Garcia: So you’re not going to tell us when Musk first

approached you?

Mr. Taibbi: Again, Congresswoman, you’re asking me to –

Ms. Garcia: You can answer yes or no.

Mr. Taibbi: You’re asking a journalist to reveal a source.

Ms. Garcia: So do you consider Mr. Musk to be the direct

source of all of this?

Mr. Taibbi: No. Now you’re trying to get me to say that he

is the source. I just can’t answer your question

about sources.

Ms. Garcia: Well, he either is or he isn’t. If you’re telling

me you can’t answer because it’s your source,

well, then, the only logical conclusion is that he

is, in fact, your source.

236

Committee Democrats have opposed the Committee’s critical oversight work since its

inception. The conduct of Democrats in attacking brave FBI whistleblowers and intrepid

investigative journalists speaks volumes to their motives. Although deeply disappointing, it is

consistent with their promises to sabotage the Committee’s work. As Leader Jeffries and

Ranking Member Nadler promised: Democrats would fight our work “tooth and nail.”

237

From the outset of the 118th Congress, Democrats have reached new lows in their

obstruction. They released nonpublic copies of the Committee’s first subpoenas to the White

House, which in turn provided them to Punchbowl. Committee Democrats were the source of the

leak because only the Committee—and not any subpoena recipients—had possession of the

versions of the subpoenas that later appeared in Punchbowl.

238

Just weeks later, Democrats

236

Id. at 65-66 (questioning from Rep. Sylvia Garcia).

237

Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (@RepJeffries), Twitter.com (Jan. 11, 2023, 10:03 AM),

https://twitter.com/RepJeffries/status/1613189897237438467; Press Release, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Nadler Blasts

Formation of New Partisan Select Subcommittee (Jan. 10, 2023).

238

See Max Cohen, Punchbowl News PM: Inside Jordan’s Subpoenas, Punchbowl News (Feb. 3, 2023).

provided cherry-picked excerpts of transcripts of whistleblower interviews to Rolling Stone and

CNN to preemptively discredit their testimony. The Democrats’ tactics in their subsequent report

and the hearing is more of the same.

A. The Actions of Committee Democrats Discourage Whistleblowing and Facilitate

Citizens’ Fear of Government.

Because the Committee Democrats’ report outed FBI whistleblowers’ identities and

substance of their testimonies to the public, one whistleblower, Allen, approached the Committee

on the condition that they could speak initially only in presence of Republicans. Regarding this

choice, Allen testified:

While I have agreed to this voluntary transcribed interview to help

the committee fulfill its constitutional oversight function, I have

concerns about the ability of the committee to protect me from

further retaliation and protect confidential information I share

during the interview. I have seen news coverage where excerpts of

other FBI whistleblower testimony to this committee has been

selectively leaked to fuel deceptive political attacks on those who

have cooperated and provided voluntary testimony. That naturally

makes me reluctant to subject myself to the same abuse, and that is

why I was not comfortable agreeing to testify in a private setting

with the same staff who are responsible for the previous leak and

smear campaign against other whistleblowers. I am comfortable

testifying to the chairman’s staff based on assurances that

confidential information provided during this interview will not be

released without my consent and authorization by the chairman.

239

Democrats’ behavior regarding their treatment of brave FBI whistleblowers is a disgrace

and an affront to the service that these whistleblowers have provided to this country. It is obvious

from whistleblowers’ testimonies that the Democrats’ actions have had their desired chilling

effect on whistleblowers who wish to come forward to expose unlawful activities within the FBI.

239

Allen Interview at 5-6.

Conclusion

The FBI, under Director Christopher Wray and Attorney General Merrick Garland, is

broken. The leadership at the FBI and Justice Department have weaponized federal law

enforcement against everyday Americans, seeking to silence those who dare to have a different

viewpoint. Whistleblowers play a vital role in identifying and rooting out waste, fraud, abuse,

and mismanagement in the federal government. When they speak out against such abuses,

federal law protects them from retaliation.

240

If you are an FBI whistleblower, however, this is

not the case. As detailed above, the brave agents who have testified to the Committee and

Subcommittee have faced devastating retaliation from the agency for their protected disclosures,

with such retaliation taking the form of indefinite suspensions without pay and being left

homeless and without income by the country’s once-preeminent law enforcement agency.

Meanwhile, whistleblower testimony highlights that the FBI’s partisan leadership is

currently engaging in a “purge” of agents who hold conservative political beliefs. Particularly,

the testimony from Friend demonstrates the agency’s blatant targeting and dismissal of

conservatives within its ranks. In Friend’s case, he was indefinitely suspended and had his

security clearance suspended for simply asking why the FBI was unnecessarily using force to

arrest individuals suspected of participating in the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.

The agency’s attacks on bold agents must cease, and this Committee and Select Subcommittee

will consider legislation aimed to curb such attacks. Additionally, the matters concerning the

FBI’s treatment of O’Boyle, Friend, Hill, and Allen will be referred to the U.S. Office of Special

Counsel and the Inspector General for further investigation.

The Committee’s and Select Subcommittee’s investigation into the weaponization of the

federal law enforcement apparatus continues. Consistent with the charge to keep the House of

Representatives informed of the oversight work, this interim report provides a summary of the

whistleblower testimony received so far. The Committee and Select Subcommittee will continue

to uncover facts to inform legislative reforms to protect civil liberties and rein in federal law

enforcement.

240

5 U.S.C. § 2303.