United Nations
S
/RES/2235 (2015)
Security Council
Distr.: General
7 August 2015
15-13352 (E)
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Resolution 2235 (2015)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 7501st meeting, on
7 August 2015
The Security Council,
Recalling the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC), and the Council’s
resolutions 1540 (2004), 2118 (2013) and 2209 (2015),
Recalling that the Syrian Arab Republic acceded to the CWC, noting that the
use of any toxic chemical, such as chlorine, as a chemical weapon in the S yrian
Arab Republic is a violation of resolution 2118, and further noting that any such use
by the Syrian Arab Republic would constitute a violation of the CWC,
Condemning in the strongest terms any use of any toxic chemical as a weapon
in the Syrian Arab Republic and noting with outrage that civilians continue to be
killed and injured by toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,
Reaffirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of
international law, and stressing again that those individuals responsible for any use
of chemical weapons must be held accountable,
Recalling its request to the Director-General of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Secretary-General to report in a
coordinated manner on non-compliance with resolution 2118,
Noting the letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security
Council of 25 February 2015 (S/2015/138), transmitting the note of the Director-
General of the OPCW, discussing the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of
4 February 2015 that expressed serious concern regarding the findings of the Fact -
Finding Mission (FFM) made with a high degree of confidence that chlorine has
been used repeatedly and systematically as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic,
Noting that toxic chemicals as weapons have allegedly been used subsequent
to the adoption on March 6 of Security Council resolution 2209 (2015),
Recognizing that the OPCW FFM is not mandated to reach conclusions about
attributing responsibility for chemical weapons use,
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Recalling that, in its resolution 2118, it decided that the Syrian Arab Republic
and all parties in Syria shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations,
1. Reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of any use of any toxic
chemical, such as chlorine, as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic;
2. Recalls its decision that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop,
produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or, transfer,
directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non -State actors;
3. Reiterates that no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire,
stockpile, retain, or transfer chemical weapons;
4. Expresses its determination to identify those responsible for these acts
and reiterates that those individuals, entities, groups, or governments responsible
for any use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical,
must be held accountable, and calls on all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic to
extend their full cooperation in this regard;
5. Requests the UN Secretary-General, in coordination with the OPCW
Director-General, to submit to the Security Council, for its authorisation, within
20 days of the adoption of this resolution, recommendations, including elements of
Terms of Reference, regarding the establishment and operation of an OPCW -United
Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify to the greatest extent feasible
individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organisers,
sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including
chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic where the OPCW
FFM determines or has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab
Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons, including
chlorine or any other toxic chemical, and expresses its intent to respond to the
recommendations, including elements of Terms of Reference, within five days of
receipt;
6. Requests further that after the Security Council has authorised the Joint
Investigative Mechanism that the United Nations Secretary -General, in coordination
with the OPCW Director-General, undertake without delay the steps, measures, and
arrangements necessary for the speedy establishment and full functioning of the
Joint Investigative Mechanism, including recruiting impartial and experienced staff
with relevant skills and expertise in accordance with Terms of Reference and notes
due regard should be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide of a
geographical basis as is practicable;
7. Recalls that in its resolution 2118, it decided that the Syrian Arab
Republic and all parties in Syria shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the
United Nations and stresses that this includes an obligation to cooperate with the
OPCW Director-General and its FFM and the United Nations Secretary-General and
the Joint Investigative Mechanism, that such cooperation includes full access to all
locations, individuals, and materials in the Syrian Arab Republic that the Joint
Investigative Mechanism deems relevant to its investigation and where it determines
there are reasonable grounds to believe access is justified based on its assessment of
the facts and circumstances known to it at the time, including in areas within the
Syrian territory but outside of the control of the Syrian Arab Republic, and that such
cooperation also includes the ability of the Joint Investigative Mechanism to
examine additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared by
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the FFM but that is related to the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism as
set forth in paragraph 5;
8. Calls on all other States to cooperate fully with the Joint Investigative
Mechanism and in particular to provide it and the OPCW FFM with any relevant
information they may possess pertaining to individuals, entities, groups, or
governments who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors or otherwise involved in
use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the
Syrian Arab Republic;
9. Requests the FFM to collaborate with the Joint Investigative Mechanism
from the commencement of the Joint Investigative Mechanism’s work to provide
full access to all of the information and evidence obt ained or prepared by the FFM
including but not limited to, medical records, interview tapes and transcripts, and
documentary material, and requests the Joint Investigative Mechanism, with respect
to allegations that are subject to investigation by the FFM, to work in coordination
with the FFM to fulfil its mandate;
10. Requests the United Nations Secretary-General, in coordination with the
OPCW Director-General, to present a report to the United Nations Security Council
and inform the OPCW Executive Council as of the date the Joint Investigative
Mechanism begins its full operations and every 30 days thereafter on the progress
made;
11. Requests the Joint Investigative Mechanism to complete its first report
within 90 days of the date on which it commences its full operations, as notified by
the United Nations Secretary-General, and complete subsequent reports as
appropriate thereafter and requests the Joint Investigative Mechanism to present the
report, or reports, to the United Nations Security Council and inform the OPCW
Executive Council;
12. Requests the Joint Investigative Mechanism to retain any evidence
related to possible uses of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic other than
those cases in which the FFM determines or has determined that a specific incident
in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as
weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, and to transmit that
evidence to the FFM through the Director-General of the OPCW and to the
Secretary-General as soon as practicable;
13. Affirms that action by the Security Council consistent with paragraph 5 is
sufficient for the establishment of the Joint Investigative Mechanism;
14. Decides to establish the Joint Investigative Mechanism for a period of
one year with a possibility of future extension by the Security Council, if it deems it
necessary;
15. Reaffirms its decision in response to violations of resolution 2118 to
impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;
16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.