Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2016–2017
mandate to ensure accountability for and prevent future
use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab
Republic.
62
The representative of the United Kingdom
maintained that the Mechanism had built its case on the
totality of evidence available to it, as “any
professional, rational investigation would do”.
63
The
representative of the Russian Federation questioned the
methodologies of the Mechanism and the OPCW fact-
finding mission, citing “systemic deficiencies” and
stating that their mandates had been implemented
selectively, without the use of the whole range of
methods and means based on the standard of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, including witness
interviews and a site visit. The result, he stated, was a
“series of gross errors” in the report of the Mechanism.
He also expressed the view that, without
comprehensive changes in its working methods, the
Mechanism would not achieve its intended goal of
closing a large gap in international tools used to
address such issues as investigating cases of chemical
terrorism and being a preventive mechanism aimed at
deterrence.
64
While expressing overall support for the
Mechanism, several other Council members also
pointed to inconsistencies in the report’s conclusions
and highlighted the need for improvement in its
methodology in the future.
65
The Council continued to discuss the renewal of
the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism,
failing to adopt two draft resolutions at the 8105th
meeting, held on 16 November 2017, and a third at the
8107th meeting, held on 17 November 2017, owing to
negative votes cast by permanent members of the
Council.
66
In a letter dated 27 December 2017,
transmitting to the Council the fifty-first monthly
report of the Director General of OPCW, submitted
pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 2118 (2013), the
Secretary-General noted that, with the end of the
mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, there
was now a gap in collective efforts to identify those
responsible for the use of chemical weapons. He
therefore reiterated his call upon the Council to give all
__________________
62
Ibid., p. 8 (United States); p. 9 (Ukraine); p. 10 (France);
p. 12 (Japan); p. 14 (Uruguay); p. 18 (United Kingdom);
and p. 22 (Sweden).
63
Ibid., p. 18.
64
Ibid., pp. 14, 15 and 17.
65
Ibid., p. 11 (Egypt); p. 12–13 (Kazakhstan); p. 19
(China); p. 20 (Plurinational State of Bolivia); and p. 21
(Ethiopia).
66
S/PV.8105, pp. 3 and 19; and S/PV.8107, p. 2. See also
draft resolution submitted by France, Italy, Japan,
Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States
(S/2017/962); draft resolution submitted by Bolivia
(Plurinational State of) (S/2017/968); and draft
resolution submitted by Japan (S/2017/970).
due attention to the ongoing reports of the use of
chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic to
preclude any impression that such weapons may be
used without consequence.
67
Case 2
Threats to international peace and security
On 21 September 2017, at its 8052nd meeting,
held at the ministerial level under the item entitled
“Threats to international peace and security”, the
Council adopted a resolution sponsored by 47 Member
States,
68
in which the Council requested the Secretary-
General to establish an investigative team to support
domestic efforts to hold ISIL (Da’esh) accountable for
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in
Iraq.
69
In the explanation of his vote during the high-
level meeting, the representative of the United
Kingdom described the resolution as a vital step in
bringing ISIL (Da’esh) to justice and, in doing so, also
in “seeking to heal the sectarian divides that Da’esh
has exploited and enflamed”.
70
The representative of
Sweden described the resolution as an example of how
the Council could take action in support of
accountability, and that accountability was critical to
delivering on the Council’s aims of reconciliation and
sustaining peace. She welcomed the global advocacy
role of the Special Adviser established under the
resolution, as well as the fact that other Member States
could request assistance from the team with the
approval of the Council.
71
Other representatives
highlighted the importance of the decision in the
context of international efforts to combat terrorism.
72
The representatives of France and Sweden expressed
the position that the investigative team should not
contribute to trials that may lead to capital
punishment.
73
A number of Council members emphasized the
need for such international investigative mechanisms
__________________
67
S/2017/1119.
68
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Djibouti, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Morocco,
Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, Poland,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.
69
Resolution 2379 (2017), para. 2.
70
S/PV.8052, pp. 2–3.
71
Ibid., p. 4.
72
Ibid., p. 5 (Kazakhstan); p. 8 (China); p. 10 (Uruguay);
and p. 11 (Egypt).
73
Ibid., p. 4 (Sweden); and p. 7 (France).